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La globalización, entendida como aumento de interconectividad e 
interdependencia entre países, es presentada como una de las 
características principales del período que se inicia a principio de los 
años ’90. El flujo comercial, la circulación de capital, de objetos, de 
ideas, así como también el desplazamiento de personas constituyen 
la dimensión material de este fenómeno que representa un impor-
tante desafío para el derecho laboral
El estudio que aquí presentamos se centra principalmente en el 
estudio de leyes, decretos de aplicación, debates parlamentarios y 
documentos de la OIT; así como también en datos secundarios 
producidos por organismos internacionales y nacionales. Igualmente, 
una parte de este amplio proceso de producción de regulación es 
reconstruido a partir de literatura especializada; particularmente, en 
el caso de la literatura jurídica.
Wangui Kimari
AND SO THE YOUTH 
FIRE RAGED ON YOUTH 
AND PRACTICES OF 
DEMOCRACY AND 
EMPOWERMENT 
IN BRAZIL
AND KENYA
Research 
and Studies 
Serie
PROGRAMA SUR-SUR
La
 p
ro
du
cc
ió
n 
de
 e
st
án
da
re
s 
la
bo
ra
le
s 
pa
ra
 e
l t
ra
ba
jo
 d
om
és
tic
o


And so the youth fire  
rAged on youth And  
prActices of democrAcy  
And empowerment  
in BrAzil And KenyA
Kimari, Wangui
   And so the youth fire raged on youth and practices of democracy and 
empowerment in Brazil and Kenya / Wangui Kimari. - 1a ed . - Ciudad 
Autónoma de Buenos Aires : CLACSO, 2016.
   Libro digital, PDF
   Archivo Digital: descarga y online
   ISBN 978-987-722-177-0
   1. Juventud. 2. Kenia. 3. Brasil. I. Título.
   CDD 323
Other descriptors allocated by CLACSO:
Democracy / Neoliberalism / State / Civil Society / Social Change / 
Developments / Economy / Empowerment / Inclusion / Integration
Wangui Kimari
South-South Program
And so the youth fire  
rAged on youth And  
prActices of democrAcy  
And empowerment  
in BrAzil And KenyA
CODESRIA
Deputy Executive Secretary  Pablo Gentili
Academic Director  Fernanda Saforcada 
Soth-South Program
Coordinator  Karina Bidaseca 
Open Acces and Dissemination Knowledge
Chief Editor  Lucas Sablich 
Art Director  Marcelo Giardino
Production  Fluxus Estudio
Cover art  Ignacio Solveyra
Proofreading  Eugenia Cervio & Sara Medina
First edition
And so the youth fire raged on youth and practices of democracy and empowerment in Brazil and Kenya (Buenos 
Aires: CLACSO, abril 2016)
ISBN  978-987-722-177-0
© Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
Queda hecho el depósito que establece la Ley 11.723.
CLACSO
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales - Conselho Latino-americano de Ciências Sociais 
(Latin American Council of Social Sciences)
Estados Unidos 1168 | C1101AAX Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Tel. [54 11] 4304 9145 | Fax [54 11] 4305 0875 | <clacsoinst@clacso.edu.ar> | <www.clacso.org>
This book is available in full text on the Web Virtual Library of CLACSO <www.biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar>
No reproduction in whole or part of this book, or stored in a computer system, or its transmitted in any form or by 
any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
CODESRIA
Executive Secretary  Dr. Ebrima Sall
Head of the Research Program  Dr. Carlos Cardoso
IDEAs
Executive Secretary  Professor Jayati Ghosh
Member of Executive Committee  Professor C.P. Chandrasekhar
The responsibility for opinions expressed in books, articles, studies and other contributions rests solely with the signing authors,  
and publication does not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Secretariat of CLACSO.
Introduction 9
Methodology 19
Brazil and Kenya 21
Youth 27
Democracy and Neoliberalism 33
‘Democracy is for the rich’ voices from youth in Kenya 43
Francis 44
Achieng 46
Mary 49
Thuo 50
Otieno 51
‘The life of a Kenyan youth is not okay, they are struggling’ 55
Salvador da Bahia, Brazil: The ‘capital of happiness’ 58
‘I am not dreaming about democracy’ 67
coNteNts
Caroline  67
Savia 69
Claudio  71
Fabiana 72
Henrique 74
‘My life is like the life of all young black people  
in the periferia’ 76
surviving Neoliberal DemocracyIndividual and collective  
strategies for youth emancipations 79
conclusion 85
Acknowledgements 89
Bibliography 91
9* This book is for Jacques Depelchin, the youth of Mathare Social Justice Centre 
(MSJC) and all the quilombo children of Brazil. It is also for the people of Salvador 
and Nairobi; thank you all for the many, many lessons.
INtroDuctIoN*
I swear to the Lord
I still can’t see
why Democracy means
everybody but me.
Langston Hughes
Things have never been the same since the re-intro-
duction of multi-party politics in Kenya and most 
parts of Africa. There came Ballot boxes and Bullet 
boxes, By-elections and Buy-elections, Freedom of 
Expression and Freedom of Oppression, Stakehold-
ers and Steak-holders (as well as Stick holders). To 
me the combination of all of these were democracy 
and demoCRAZY (as well as Demon-cracy)
Preface to ‘Democrazy’ by Gado, 
an East African cartoonist
I’m not dreaming about democracy
Savia, young person from Salvador
IN BoTH BrAzIL AND KENyA, countries where the median age is 
lower than 35,1 youth are seen to be, as evidenced by the June 2013 
national bus strike in Brazil and the occupy Parliament campaigns 
in Kenya of May 2013, questioning more ardently the forms of nor-
mative political practice within their contexts. During the transport 
and anti-World Cup protests, and which were coupled with other col-
1 I am using the AU definition of youth, which categorises anyone between the ages 
of 15-35 as a young person. In Brazil, the median age is roughly 30.7, and in Kenya, 
it is 19.1. Therefore, the majority of the population in both countries can be included 
as part of this generation (CIA, 2014).
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lective convenings that occurred almost continuously in Brazil from 
June 2013 up until June 2014, there were demonstrations in which 
more than one hundred thousand of mostly young people2 took to the 
streets. Their demands were for passe livre and for better quality pub-
lic transport. At the same time, these were exigencies tied to a variety 
of broader social welfare imperatives and dissatisfaction with prevail-
ing political institutions and practices. occurring in the context of a 
looming World Cup, and also inflamed by the colossal expenses of the 
‘cup to end all cups’; these protests took on a particularly pronounced 
and frustrated generational tenor.3 While a mostly urban phenomenon 
calling for ‘FIFA quality hospitals and schools’4 was observed nation-
ally, regional differences were also discerned. For the most part these 
protests also acted as a ‘grito dos excluídos’5 —a cry of the excluded. 
Notwithstanding this, in the North Eastern city of Salvador, those who 
participated in these ‘cries’ also came with more localised demands; 
marching for an end to the genocide of young black people,6 to reli-
gious intolerance against the yoruba-Brazilian religion of Candomblé 
and other Afro-Brazilian religions, to violence against women and po-
lice violence as a whole (the latter taking on a pronounced gravity in 
Salvador where the police were using real bullets7 in contrast to oth-
er cities in the South where they used rubber bullets against mostly 
young white protestors) (S, personal communication and CMS, 2013). 
In addition, the colour of the people who were most intimately vi-
olated by the pre-World Cup raids8 and subsequent police occupations 
in these specific neighbourhoods, also confirmed the spatio-racial 
apartheids present in this context and the dissimilar experiences of 
being young that are part of this nation. These variances also emerged 
in the gritos of the young people on the streets who, nevertheless, were 
seen to have a common rallying motivation—a deep discontent with 
the prevailing political, social and economic state of affairs; conditions 
which appear to accrete, deeper, in their generation’s circumstance(s).
In Kenya, the occupy Parliament protests of May 2013 were also 
primarily a youth-led affair. These targeted Members of Parliament 
(or MPigs, as they were dubbed by the participating activists) who, 
2 See Watts (2013). 
3 Wyre Davies (2014).
4 Dave zirin (2014).
5 Ibahia (2013).
6 See the work of the campaign Reaja Ou Sera Morto/a.
7 Camara Municipal de Salvador (2013).
8 BBC News (2014a).
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seemingly one of their first actions after they were elected in March 
of the same year, had attempted to increase their monthly wage by 
the equivalent of about four thousand dollars.9 This amount would 
be in addition to the six thousand dollars that they were already earn-
ing; an amount that was also couched and inflated by a bevy of other 
exorbitant allowances. While these MPigs were the target, they were 
also the prism through which to comment on widespread youth dis-
pleasure with national politics and the immiserating socio-economic 
conditions that did not appear registered in the consciousness of leg-
islators who appeared more inclined towards self-enrichment. In the 
Facebook invitation to the initial political gathering, an event that was 
to gain subsequent infamy primarily due to the theatrical dumping of 
pigs and their blood at the entrance of the national assembly, organ-
izers asserted that one of their key aims was ‘to make Members of 
Parliament aware that the days of parliamentary dictatorship are over. 
MPs cannot—and must not!—be self-regulating; they must be answer-
able to the people’.10 
More recently a May 2014 protest against the proposed rise in 
tuition fees by university students in major cities such as Nairobi, Ki-
sumu and Eldoret also brought forward a list of demands that, com-
parable to the protests in Brazil, spoke to a wider host of structural 
frustrations. For these students their situation has been one in which 
tuition fees are increased abruptly11 (for this trend in North America 
see: Giroux, 2014) while a conjunction of neoliberal regimes and other 
situated interventions (such as increased taxes on food) jeopardized 
living standards, and worked towards foreclosing the possibility of 
post-secondary education for many Kenyan youth.
Demographically, many of those who took part in these protests 
were born in the 1980s. This is a time that has been referred to as the 
9 Kenyan lawmakers are the second highest paid legislators in the world, and al-
ready earn a yearly salary that is roughly seventy six times Kenya’s GDP per capita 
(Herbling, 2013).
10 official Facebook invitation page for the occupy Parliament rally on May 14, 
2013 at <https://www.facebook.com/events/358217317613270/> accessed November 
1, 2014.
11 A 2010 Commission for University Education (CUE) study, supported by the 
World Bank and the Kenyan government, recommended the doubling of tuition fees, 
and an increase in the interest paid on the tuition fee loans to the Higher Education 
Loan Board (Andae, 2014). Without a doubt, the increase in tuition fees emerges 
from these kinds of ‘recommendations’ that are tied to the current national neoliberal 
imperatives of the state. The introduction of university fees in 1991, after decades 
when these costs were born by the government, also came out of a similar laissez-
faire inflected World Bank backed plan that recommended, ‘cost sharing’(Andae, 
2014).
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‘lost decade’,12 although it has been succeeded by other ‘lost’ decades 
in Kenya and elsewhere (rono, 2002). Moreover, it was a period char-
acterized by the country’s more sustained engagement with neoliberal 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), as well as their resultant 
negative effects on employment, agricultural sector(s), health care, the 
education system and social welfare as a whole (rono, 2002; Parsitau, 
2008). While these youth often hear about the good old days before 
this decade—of jobs, a cheaper standard of living, land, free education 
and the abundant possibilities signified by infant postcoloniality— 
their insistent reality is one which harbours the negative ‘convergence 
of structural adjustment, globalization, political change and trade lib-
eralization’ (Simone, 2001: 103); a time that, as is often maintained by 
a key interlocutor in Nairobi, is full of ‘social challenges’. 
In their lives, this coming together of unfavourable dynamics is 
evidenced on public and intimate levels by high unemployment, the 
high cost of food, inaccessible secondary and post-secondary educa-
tion, and general state divesture from seemingly anything but the pri-
vate sector.13 Neither ‘good governance’ democracy nor ‘social’ laissez-
faire initiatives have offered anything but palliatives to the individual 
and social body effects of these neoliberal practices that are deeply 
embedded in the local political economy (rono, 2002; Parsitau, 2008). 
Instead, Kenya, while now recently deemed low middle income14 (an 
announcement received with very little public fanfare locally) has one 
of the highest levels of income disparity in the world.15 Furthermore, 
half of its population is living below the poverty line—a situation in-
flected by regional disparities and which, in all cases, is particularly 
pronounced for the youth, a gendered category, who make up the ma-
jority of the population.
12 My assumption is that rono (2002) borrows this phrase from the English transla-
tion of la década perdida, which is used widely to reference a similar period in Latin 
America, and particularly in Mexico.
13 As a read through Vision 2030 Kenya’s foremost national development plan (re-
leased in 2006) illustrates, private equity takes precedence over any social welfare 
investment. The Kenyan government views such private investment as supreme in 
the quest to develop the economy (Vision, 2030). This overwhelming focus on corpo-
rate capital is ironic considering the deep structural inequalities that shape all socio-
political relations in the country.
14 BBC News (2014b). 
15 Kenya’s Gini coefficient, also referred to as the Gini index or ratio, is 44.5 (Society 
for International Development 2014). The Gini index is an inequality metric that 
measures the distribution of national income or consumption of households in an 
economy. Using the Lorenz curve, which plots income received against the number 
of recipients in an economy, a Gini coefficient measure of 0 indicates absolute equal-
ity and a measure of 100 indicates absolute inequality.
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Some contradictory ‘openings’16 have been engendered by the 
state during these times of neoliberal democracy. These include the 
introduction of free primary school education17 and maternal health-
care, although there is often the perfunctory ‘cost sharing’ (such as the 
purchasing of uniforms and compulsory exam fees paid by parents 
with children in primary school) associated with these services.18 All 
the same, in my opinion, their long absence is more symbolic than 
their present implementation—especially in the current neoliberal ar-
chitecture in which they are employed. Nevertheless, in light of the 
serious need for these provisions, their application, however minimal, 
is still important and has positively impacted many rural and urban 
communities, even while traditional guarantors of self-improvement, 
such as education, do not allow for the same socio-economic realiza-
tions they once did. 
In addition, and on a more subjective level, there has been what 
I have previously referred to as openings that have developed due to 
the availability of transnational politico-cultural practices such as Hip 
Hop, which emerges nationally amidst other global ideas, items and 
images. When localized these symbols and material goods allow for a 
somewhat boundless conception of self and lifeworlds: identities that 
span cultures and geographies and which are often established and 
oriented in the local environment primarily by young people (see Nta-
rangwi, 2009; and Weiss, 2009, on the impact of Hip Hop on youth 
identities in Kenya and Tanzania, respectively). All the same, these 
openings are overlaid by widespread socio-economic precarity that, as 
mentioned above, often take on a striking gravity for these youth. In 
this regard, Giroux (2014) asserts that:
16 I use the term openings to capture more recent phenomena, such as Hip Hop and 
the globalization of goods and ideas, that allow for the proliferation of self-definitions 
and which become possible due to the increasing proximity to other geographies and 
cultures that globalization allows for. I use this word to denote ‘a space or gap that 
allows passage or access’, as per the oxford English Dictionary definition.
17 President Mwai Kibaki instituted free primary education in 2002 soon after he 
took office. However, the quality of education in most of these public schools, as 
well as the prevailing costs of buying uniforms and compulsory extracurricular ac-
tivities, still makes the cost of attending primary school quite high and inaccessible 
for many.
18 Uhuru Kenyatta’s government implemented free maternal healthcare when he 
took office in 2013. While welcomed by many, the standards of healthcare still remain 
uncertain and there are also long waiting periods before one is attended to. As a 
consequence, for those who are able to, many women opt for home birth attendants, 
small private clinics or the myriad of foreign funded subsidised health care clinics if 
they can afford it.  
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What is particularly distinctive about the current historical conjunc-
ture is the way in which young people, particularly low-income and 
poor minority youth across the globe, have been increasingly denied 
any place in an already weakened social order and the degree to which 
they are no longer seen as central to how a number of countries across 
the globe define their future (Giroux, 2014).
He goes on to say that:
Suffering under huge debts, a jobs crisis, state violence, a growing sur-
veillance state, and the prospect that they would inherit a standard of 
living far below that enjoyed by their parents, many young people have 
exhibited a rage that seems to deepen their resignation, despair, and 
withdrawal from the political arena (Giroux, 2014).
The aforementioned movements and protests in both countries are 
evidence of much of what Giroux (2014) has asserted above. Although 
cautious of declaring that youth have withdrawn fully from the po-
litical arena, I suggest that they may have taken their political spaces 
elsewhere, constructed other temporary—or even permanent—loca-
tions from which to enact their own (dis)politics. Heeding the 2013 
CoDESrIA / CLASCo call to attend to the localized entanglements of 
democracy and neoliberalism, this research is oriented by the bid to 
see what other political spaces have been established by young people 
in Kenya and Brazil, and what this says about how they fit in to nor-
mative political fora with their hegemonic discourses of democracy 
and neoliberalism; ideologies which often seek to impose on youth 
particular kinds of political practices and subjectivities. overwhelm-
ingly, it is also an attempt to share strategies and political imagina-
tions that have emerged from poor urban youth in both countries; 
approaches, I argue, that also gesture towards the futures for these 
youth, their urban settings, and of the ‘democratic’ and ‘neoliberal’ 
political processes that have been entrenched in their national spaces.
This inquiry is organized around three main questions. These are, 
first: How do the discourses and practices of democracy and neoliberal-
ism, if at all, shape young people’s lives? Second: How do their day-to-
day actions imply a response to the present ‘democratic’ and ‘neoliberal’ 
moment that is said to be characteristic of these two locations, and what 
negotiations (both collective and individual) are part of these responses? 
Third: What are the similarities and dissimilarities in the responses of 
the youth in Nairobi and Salvador, and what can these shared practices 
open up for (neoliberal) democracy?
My main argument in this paper is that youth are questioning 
and seeking to reconfigure the normalized practices of (neoliberal) 
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democracy in their locations in momentous but more so in mundane 
ways. I do not aim to bring a new theoretical understanding of democ-
racy or neoliberalism but rather attend to their in situ constraints for 
this generation. In addition, I also share how young people navigate 
these limitations in ways that rework and localize understandings of 
(neoliberal) democracy. I offer these sharings from both countries 
alongside each other to facilitate an exchange of these survivals strat-
egies, in particular as it is empirically evident that these youth are 
constricted by and are suffering from the same phenomena. Finally, I 
believe that in exploring these generational constraints, reconfigura-
tions, and sharings within neoliberal democracy that this interplay 
offers glimpses of the futures for this generation and contemporary 
politics in their locations. 
While I began by mentioning some of the big evenemential 
ways in which youth ‘crisis’ is expressed (in the public transporta-
tion boycott in Brazil and the occupy Parliament protests in Kenya, 
recall), for the most part this generational dissatisfaction and re-
sponse to the status quo is expressed in more ordinary ways—in 
everyday life practices, and usually those for economic survival. 
To be sure there is quiescence, fragmentation and contradiction in 
their individual and collective actions. Even so, what can be dis-
cerned from the interviews which inform this work is that, for the 
most part, there is also enterprise, reflection, dedication and inno-
vation which is entwined in and inspired by a concern for self and 
community (ies). My main point of departure is that it is precisely 
in the practices that are engaged in for individual and collective 
survival, that these youth speak of and look for other trajectories 
of political practice, and question the citizenships that democracy 
expects them to embody. Survival strategies here include education 
and ‘hustling’19 (and hustling as education as is often the case) and 
collective socio-economic ventures whose polyvalence (and ambigu-
ous legal status) leaves them devoid of possible classification. These 
practices are often in tension with the status quo yet position youth 
as powerful agents and not dangerous subjects—in sharp distinc-
tion to how they are often imagined in the orthodox political insti-
tutions that have been inherited in both countries. Moreover, these 
are actions which can create provisional or enduring experimental 
political arenas, contact zones of livelihood and democratic pro-
19 The ‘hustle’ as is used in Kenya refers to small commercial activities conducted 
in order to get by. It does not; in anyway, have the negative connotations that it may 
suggest in North America. Most young people in Nairobi are engaged in some sort of 
small business a ka-hustle, and often multiple at a go, in order to make ends meet.
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cess, in even the most routine and sometimes spontaneous of activi-
ties, many of which are tied to simple economic survival and even 
cultural and recreational communions.  
This attention to micro practices is not to diminish what may 
one day cohere to be large-scale symbolic action that may profoundly 
alter their lives. Neither does my focus on their different civic engage-
ments mean that they are overwhelmingly divorced from normative 
political institutions (although for the most part the youth interviewed 
did view these institutions and their representatives with suspicion). 
However, this emphasis on their own notions and blends of political 
practice is also able to highlight as well, on various scales, the inher-
ent problems with what is often the hegemonic and Western praxis 
of democracy, particularly in its simultaneous concern, at once, with 
involving youth ‘voice’ and its rejection of the ways in which youth 
want their voices included. Additionally, while they do not, unsolic-
ited, reference the politico-economic actions that they engage in as 
democratic (in fact they seem quite uninterested in the word), one 
can infer that since they regard mainstream political practices in their 
contexts as undemocratic, the actions which they engage in to create 
these economic and political equalities could be their alternatives for 
democracy— their more intuitive democracy (ies). I say this cautious-
ly as this is not a term they used to refer their own actions, but that is 
an inference of my own.
As will become more evident in a later section of this paper that 
shares excerpts of their own narratives, the most important strategies 
that both groups of youth took up and suggested for surviving the 
violent machinations of neoliberal democracy were resilient internal 
and collective strength—an unwavering optimistic resolve to just do 
what they felt they needed to do because they had to do it. This was 
expressed through various idioms such as ‘don’t give up’ and ‘keep 
fighting’. And as one Kenyan youth whose daily life interacts with 
some of the most sinister elements of the neoliberal penalty stated: 
‘keeping hope alive, hard work and perseverance, that’s all. you can’t 
give up’ (zulekha, interview September 15, 2014). This dialectical in-
vestment in hope is deeply imbricated in and results from the daily 
actions that they engage in—whether legal or illegal, traditional or 
alternative or a combination of these—that also fuels the imagination 
for a better future. It is part of a symbiotic process of visualization; 
of sustaining a creative and determined imaginary that is cause and 
effect, the seed and the fruits, even amidst apparent hopelessness. 
This is maintained through individual and intersubjective actions 
and allows for visions of improved presents and futures anchored in a 
kind of possible memory of the future; in an affective conviction that 
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things can only get better if they continue to do what they are doing 
which is, more often than not, striving. This faith and imagination is 
a key element of the scaffolding which, such is the hope harboured, 
will enable the advent of a political and economic environment that is 
‘answerable to them’. This assertion of the persistent faith of youth in 
future(s) amidst dystopic projections for them worldwide challenges 
a vast array of literature that focuses mostly on their rage and de-
spair: their crisis.
In addition, I show here that while the grammar of neoliberalism 
does not orient their lives and is not part of the day-to-day lexicon of 
the majority of youth in Kenya and Brazil, it aggravates many of the 
forces that they have been living under, and it re-entrenches a pre-
carity that has long structured their lives. Notwithstanding some of 
the novelty in its dislocations and refractions, neoliberalism is a (re)
instantiation, in both new and repetitive forms, of many of the his-
torical forces that these African and Afro-Brazilian youth have been 
living under. These youth already knew that the world was a mar-
ket, and that they were part of communities who suffered its most 
occultist and arbitrary manifestations. Because of this they respond 
positively to ideas of (neoliberal) democratization when it works for 
them, but are ready to go beyond and above its established practices 
and search for other individual and collective processes in order to 
survive socially, economically and politically (and often psychologi-
cally). In this regard, they may simultaneously offer both counter-
narratives and dominant narratives of democracy, even as they work 
to fill in its huge gaps. 
Inevitably, this work will also attend to questions of history, ge-
ography, citizenship, imperial effects, ‘radical imaginations’ (Giroux, 
2014), violence, love, capitalism, death, pedagogy, intersubjectivity, 
violence and the anthropology of states, democracies and neoliber-
alism, etc. While not a central theme, and not explored explicitly in 
this paper, I am also interested in ethnographically contributing to 
(what appears to be fairly under examined and perhaps misnamed at 
least in Africa) theorizations of what is seen as youth apathy. often, 
missing from many foci on African youth are intricate accounts of 
why young people choose not to get into ‘normal’ institutionalized 
politics, and the different tactical and temporary ways that they may 
engage with mainstream political institutions. Deeper and broader 
accounts of this ‘apathy’ in the US and Europe have examined the 
‘moral panic’ over, for example, low voter turnout among youth and 
their preference for more issue based politics, ‘causes’ rather than 
‘collectives’ (for example, see the works of rossi, 2014; McDowell et 
al., 2015; roholt et al., 2007; Cammaerts et al., 2014). To my knowl-
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edge this has not been extensively discussed in Africa, where it seems 
that the political stakes are materially higher for young people, where 
voter turnout appears to be increasing rather than decreasing and 
where youth may be tied to formal political organizations in impor-
tant but tenuous ways, as the unemployed youth ‘rent-a mob’ hired 
for a variety of electoral ‘needs’. This apocalyptic view of African 
youth and politics is alluded to by rossi (2009) when he asserts that 
in many countries in the global south the ‘abstinence’ of young people 
from politics could be viewed with relief (rossi, 2009: 473). There-
fore, with these situated differences in play (as well as due to the 
widely propagated view of African youth and their potential for and 
practice of unruly politics) there is more work to be done in order to 
bring out the complexities inherent in ‘youth apathy’ in Africa and 
Latin America. Nonetheless, work on this in the US and Europe also 
gives us insights into the general political dissatisfaction plaguing 
youth worldwide, and the situated ways in which economic precar-
ity and identity can affect how they engage in mainstream politics. 
Alongside apathy and the aforementioned topics that are immanent 
in this work, a medley of attendant themes, while not all recognized 
above, are implicated in the struggles and practices of young people 
in Brazil and Kenya as they battle with the question that also haunts 
this paper: what would it take for us to get political regimes that are 
working for and answerable to all?
 This work is organized as follows: the first section, titled 
Methodology, discusses the motivations for this paper and confers 
why Kenya and Brazil are chosen as the sites for this research. This 
section also includes working definitions and expositions of key con-
cepts such as ‘youth’, ‘democracy’ and ‘neoliberalism,’ as well as a run 
through of the methods that were used to collect data. This is followed 
by a section on the experiences of five Kenyan youth from Nairobi, 
and these narratives are shaped by the three guiding questions stated 
earlier. The majority of this section will be excerpts from the individu-
al interviews with these young people so that their own experiences, in 
their own words, can be conveyed. The focus then shifts to the experi-
ences of Brazilian youth from Salvador, which also follows the format 
of the earlier section on Kenya. Both of these country specific sets of 
youth experiences are anchored in the particular political, economic, 
and social contexts of the respective countries, with particular regard 
for how this manifests in the cities in question. The next section ex-
plores the dominant themes that emerged in both country studies, 
from the experiences shared, and focuses on the strategies for survival 
in democracy that youth in both locations offer to each other and to 
their peers broadly. I conclude by summarizing my main arguments 
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as well as highlighting other emergent themes which could offer path-
ways for further inquiry. 
MethoDologY
This research is informed by recent and ongoing expressions of youth 
discontent in both Brazil and Kenya, and by the generative possibili-
ties, they open up in their fervent bids to challenge marginalising con-
ditions. It is inspired by the tactile resilience of many young people (a 
resilience that goes way above the recent fetishization of the term by 
the UN and other agencies) across these geographies who make life 
work even when it does not want to work for them (and in fact appears 
to want to kill them); when they are caught amidst violent structural 
conditions of being while also engulfed in the dislocating discourses 
and practices of adulthood, neoliberalism, and the discordant narra-
tives of renewed and (re)democratized political life. In Kenya, these 
latter political chronicles have focused on independence, multiparty 
democracy, civil society dominance and a new Constitution;20 while 
in Brazil, such narratives revolve around watershed events like the 
end of the dictatorship, the rise (and fall) of social movements, the 
promulgation of a new constitution, and Lula’s ‘third way’ (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2003). 
In addition, this research is motivated by a Pan African desire to 
connect Brazil with broader African struggles in light of shared histo-
ry, present(s), and expected futures, especially given the positioning of 
BrICS, which, for better or worse is intended to provoke greater eco-
nomic and political approximation between Africa and Brazil. It also 
comes as a bid to connect academic work to situated struggles, uphold 
often sidelined youth perspectives, ethnographically theorize both the 
20 All of these processes in Kenya were meant to signal a rupture from a previous 
non-democratic environment. Political independence in 1963 was meant to mark the 
end of colonial life and to herald the emergence of new free, modern, and agentive 
African subjects. In 1992, multiparty democracy was (re)established, and in 2002, the 
national elections brought about an end to the dictatorship of Daniel T. Arap Moi. 
This democratization of political participation was parallel to a rise in the promi-
nence of the NGo sphere (See: Piot, 2010) for more on this in Togo). In 2010, a new 
progressive constitution, which institutionalized the devolution of power by creating 
local governments, was promulgated. All of these normative democratic processes 
were thought to signal the potential for greater political participation by young peo-
ple nationally. Without diminishing some of the openings that these changes have 
brought about for some, the young people interviewed still feel that the formal politi-
cal sphere—with its consequences for both public and private life—offers very few 
options for meaningful political participation in the ways that they as youth would 
want to participate, and neither does it implement the fundamental socio-economic 
rights that they would want guaranteed.
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neoliberal conditions of being and the responses to them by youth 
in the South, and to work for broader social, economic and political 
change in and beyond southern geographies. It is, finally, informed 
by both non-academic narratives about the lives of structurally mar-
ginalized populations in both of these places, as well as anthropologi-
cal studies on related themes in both countries (see, amongst others: 
Scheper-Hughes, 1993; Goldstein, 2003; Alves and Evanson, 2011; 
Caldeira, 1996, 1999; Ntarangwi, 2009; rasmussen, 2010; on youth 
elsewhere see Jensen, 2008; Weiss, 2009). Theoretically and methodo-
logically, it is situated primarily in the discipline of anthropology, but 
is heavily interdisciplinary and draws from history, geography, politi-
cal science, cultural studies and sociology—all of which are localized 
to address the particular contours of life in these two locations. 
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BrAzIl AND KeNYA
AT FIrST GLANCE, Kenya and Brazil may appear completely dispa-
rate and counterintuitive localities in which to anchor a comparison 
of young urban life amidst democracy and neoliberalism. Brazil’s pop-
ulation is about 200 million, roughly five times that of Kenya’s 44.5 
million (World Bank 2014 statistics). In addition, they have different 
cultural geographies, languages, and politico-economic histories that 
are heavily inflected by the legacies of a plantation economy in the 
case of Brazil, and by the extant dependencies of (post) coloniality 
in Kenya. The ‘green city in the sun’ is also very different from the 
hot undulating beaches of Salvador. yet a common experience of ex-
treme wealth inequality despite their formalized middle income sta-
tus,—both remain among the most unequal societies in the world in 
terms of class, regional, and racial disparities in the case of Brazil—as 
well as similar politico-economic experiences since the late 1980s, al-
lows for common ground in which to anchor a comparison of young 
urban life. Essentially, these referred contemporary political and eco-
nomic experiences were constituted by ‘neoliberal economic policies, 
the microeconomic integration of domestic capital into transnational 
circuits (i.e., denationalisation of firms and their integration into glob-
al value chains) [and] a decisive role for finance in economic policy-
making, and political democracy’ (Saad Filho, 2010: 12). 
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Within these post 1980s conditions it becomes apparent that neo-
liberalism can be seen as the economic form of democracy while de-
mocracy is the political form of neoliberalism (Petras and Veltemeyer, 
2003; Saad Filho, 2010, 2014). Essentially, they live in each other, and 
it is the hegemony of this coincidence (which is not a coincidence) 
in both Brazil and Kenya that also renders this comparison possible. 
The 2010 visit of the then Brazilian President Lula to Kenya ‘to unlock 
new areas of social and economic cooperation, including bio-diesel 
fuel production and soccer training’1 also validates these similarities. 
While Lula’s visit was taken locally as an indication of the ‘shift’ in 
Kenya’s global trade relations— refocusing its gaze East and South 
and no longer North—, an international relations expert in São Paulo 
was quoted as saying, in relation to invigorated Brazil / Africa rela-
tions, that ‘what brings them together is that they are at the frontier of 
capitalism’2, and one could add democracy.
In addition, both Nairobi and Salvador are cities where the 
majority of the population are youth, and where the bulk of urban 
residents live in poor urban settlements. Experientially, they are also 
countries where I have engaged in both community and research 
work, particularly with youth, and are two cities that I know per-
sonally having been born and presently living in Nairobi, and also 
having conducted ongoing research in Salvador since 2007. As a re-
sult, for better or worse, I have spent a significant amount of time 
recognizing, living, and reflecting on the covert and overt similarities 
between them.
Brazil and Kenya’s experiences with neoliberalism and democ-
racy, or neoliberal democracy—as they are often conveyed as a ‘two-
for-one package’ (Beaudreau and Clairzier, 2009; Saad Filho, 2010, 
2014)—have not been too dissimilar. Kenya’s forays with neoliberal 
economic interventions grew immensely in the early 1980s, and, simi-
larly in Brazil this explicit neoliberal turn gained traction in the late 
1980s after the end of the dictatorship. In both countries this involved 
the political and economic processes mentioned earlier (Saad Filho, 
2014), and these economic restructuring directives were the agenda 
of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), who are tasked by their mem-
bers to bring about what they envision as global development through 
financial and professional assistance. As the ideology of neoliberal-
ism permeates deep within the architectures of these institutions, the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes employed included drastic liber-
1 Allan odhiambo (2010). 
2 Christian Lohbauer quoted in odhiambo (2010).
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alization instruments such as deregulation, privatization, and reduced 
public expenditure on health, housing, education, agriculture and 
other public services. Since their implementation in many countries 
in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America, it has been documented 
that these programmes have had devastating social and economic ef-
fects on many lives (Stiglitz, 2002; Ferguson, 2006; Weiss, 2009; Auy-
ero and Swistun, 2009; Gandolfo, 2009; Sommers, 2010; Mains, 2011). 
Furthermore, Ferguson (2006) discusses how these neoliberal prac-
tices took shape on the African continent, and led to transformations 
in the senses of self of African subjects in relation to complex disposi-
tions of global connection and disconnection. Feelings of connectivity 
are linked to access to transnational goods and citizenships (human 
rights, cultural identities, etc.) that neoliberalism produced, and the 
disconnections are a result of the fall in living standards and the seem-
ing distance between socio-political and economic lives lived on the 
continent, and those lived in the West. referring to these ‘disconnec-
tions’ in the Kenyan experience, rono (2002) argues that:
The structural adjustment programme has generally encompassed re-
duced relative expenditures on basic needs and social services, mainly 
education and health costs. Local products have been subjected to seri-
ous competition from imported ones and often from subsidized com-
modities. In this process, the poor have been exposed to severe socio-
economic risks such as unemployment and retrenchment. Economic 
decline has gone hand in hand with the depreciation of the Kenya shil-
ling, rising interest rates, the reduction of government expenditure, 
especially in the development and welfare sectors, the limiting of wage 
increases and the reduction of government subsidies at the national 
level. There is evidence to show that the SAPs have increased the gap 
between the rich and the poor as well as the income gap between 
the rural and the urban population in Kenya thus increasing poverty 
(rono, 2002: 87).
overall, the political, social and economic effects on the ground have 
been dire; the full grasp of their manifestations are only incrementally 
being revealed and, yet, still do much to temper the cited advances of 
this neoliberal period.
Earlier we mentioned some of what are seen as the openings from 
the particular politico-economic moment. Aside from free primary ed-
ucation and maternal healthcare, there are also the ‘connections’ (Fer-
guson, 2006) and human rights and freedoms discourses (Englund, 
2006) that engender multiple conceptions of self, as well as claims 
from the state. The attachments to these connections and hegemonic 
human rights and freedom discourses illustrate their growing uptake 
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on the ground. In Kenya, many of these rights and freedoms have 
been legislated in the 2010 Constitution, and there were wide efforts 
to familiarize wananchi, the common person, with this document and 
with astounding results.3 All the same, the application of these rights 
is mediated by the lack of basic necessities such as food, water and 
housing, and the reluctance of established political scaffolding that 
does not reform so easily. The fracture(s) between legislated rights 
and the inability to claim them will be evident in the narratives of the 
young people interviewed and which follow in a subsequent section.
In Brazil the advances attributed to neoliberalism, particularly 
since the latter 2000s, include the following:
Twenty-one million jobs were created in the 2000s, in contrast with 11 
million in the 1990s; the Gini coefficient fell from 0.57 in 1995 to 0.52 
in 2008; the incomes of the bottom decile rose by 91 percent between 
2001 and 2009, while the incomes of the top decile increased by 16 
percent. Incomes rose by 42 percent in the poorer Northeast against 16 
percent in the richer Southeast, and more in rural than in urban areas. 
Female income rose by 38 percent against 16 percent for men, and the 
income of Blacks rose 43 percent against 20 percent for Whites. The 
population below the poverty line fell from 36 percent in 2003 to 23 
percent in 2008 (Saad Filho, 2014).
The author goes on to add that:
Despite these achievements, the Brazilian economy has slowed down 
since 2011, for three reasons. First, government policies have failed to 
kick-start self-sustaining growth driven by private investment. Second, 
the balance of payments has deteriorated because of the slowdown in 
Brazil’s main markets (China, the EU and the US), sluggish commodity 
prices, and currency devaluations and export-led strategies in several 
large economies. Third, the domestic currency has been vulnerable to 
shifts in capital flows due to economic policy shifts in the advanced 
economies (Saad Filho, 2014).
This slow-down, a direct result of the recession in other economies, is 
coupled with recent massive expenditure on mega-events: the World 
3 one interviewee in Mathare, Nairobi, estimated that of the people in his constitu-
ency ‘90% are constitution literat’. This is due to the widespread formal and informal 
efforts to make Kenyans aware of their new Constitution that occurred both before 
and after it was promulgated in 2010. At the same time, while the instruments may 
be there in theory to challenge any political action or inaction by their leaders, which 
they do not agree with, citizens are often hampered by prevailing institutional atti-
tudes that do not always support or encourage people taking up these rights. 
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Cup and the forthcoming olympics. The combination of a slowdown 
in the economy and major expenditure on such colossal international 
convenings has provoked many Brazilians to call for ‘more bread’, 
‘fewer stadiums’ and ‘FIFA-standard hospital’. one young interview-
ee in Salvador, commenting on his lived post-Fordist reality asserted 
that, in his view, neoliberalism has worked to ‘mercantilize all social 
rights’ and in this way created a ‘social catastrophe’ particularly in 
the poor urban periferias of Salvador where he comes from. Similarly, 
in the marginalized areas of Nairobi, ongoing neoliberal economic 
policy and its ‘democratic’ political avatar aggravate conditions of 
an already entrenched precarity. This grave disparity is then (re)en-
trenched in these spaces for years to come. As a result, the peripheral 
urban areas in both countries seem to be the sites of neoliberalism’s 
most pronounced ‘ruin-making’ (Stoler, 2008), and this devastation 
seems to weigh disproportionately on the lives of young people due 
to a ‘diachronic sequence of historical transformations’ of which neo-
liberal democracy is the most recent instantiation (Wacquant , 2008: 
9). It is due to this convergence of factors and the ways in which they 
combine in the lives of young people in particular, that this research 
has prioritized the category of youth.
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Youth
For THIS rESEArCH, I purposely use the definition of youth that 
is contained in the African youth charter. This charter classifies all 
those between the ages of 15-35 as youth (African Union, 2006: 3). I 
privilege this designation over the UN definition, 15-24 years of age, 
for the reason that, in my opinion, the AU definition best captures 
the situation in both Nairobi and Salvador where, due to a myriad 
of social and economic reasons, young people often find themselves 
‘stuck’ in their progression through the locally accepted and desired 
life course. In this regard, they may start school later, stay there long-
er, and start working long after their peers in the global North. And 
in situations of high unemployment young people1 would then gain 
independence from their families later in their lives as they would be 
engulfed in a period of ‘waithood’ (Honwana, 2012); in this way living 
1 There are various statistics for youth unemployment in Kenya, and these run 
anywhere from 65% to 80%. In Brazil, Campos (2013) puts unemployment at about 
50.5%, and it is reasonable to infer that youth constitute the bulk of these figures. 
Notwithstanding this, it is likely that both of these country statistics on unemploy-
ment may have included even those in ‘informal’ employment. Tied to this, the poly-
valence of youth employment situations, as we will see in the excerpts, was also likely 
not considered in these formal measures. These are some of the issues, which invari-
ably contribute to diverse statistics on employment.
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as ‘youth’ for often much longer than the 24 years delimited by the 
United Nations (Mabala, 2011). 
This age group is also prioritized here because they make up the 
majority of the African population. one in four Africans is between 
the ages of 10 and 19 years old, and the absolute number of young 
people in sub-Saharan Africa is growing faster than anywhere else in 
the world (Sommers, 2010: 318-321). Similarly, the majority of the 
population in Brazil is young, with an average age of 30.7 years—well 
within the AU’s definition of youth. Due to worsening socio-economic 
conditions (and this was well attested to in the interviews conducted), 
few young people can afford to leave their home until quite late into 
what the UN categorizes as ‘adulthood’.
Numerical designation aside youth is a category that has both 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ meanings, and which is significant in various ways in 
both local idioms and transnational bureaucratic discourse (Burgess, 
2005; Durham, 2000). In the colonial period, being young in East Af-
rica was defined along a trajectory of historical meanings that marked 
transitions in important life stages (for instance childhood, warrior-
hood and adulthood) with relatively public and socially sanctioned life-
cycle rituals like circumcision and marriage (Burgess, 2005; Durham 
, 2000). In addition, both in Africa and beyond, youthfulness emerges 
as iconic of situated political events. For example, also in Colonial 
East Africa, the category youth was often used by gerontocracies to 
define people with ‘fire in their belly’, ‘independence’ or ‘pride’ (Burton 
and Charton-Bigot, 2010: 10). More recently, events such as the ‘Arab 
Spring’ as well as, particular to this paper, the aforementioned passe 
livre and anti-World Cup protests in Brazil and the university and oc-
cupy Parliament movements in Kenya attest to this generational ‘fire’ 
which is said to be embodied by youth.
Currently the negative material effects of economic restructur-
ing such as increasing poverty, a narrowing of the welfare state, and 
high unemployment and underemployment create a youth demo-
graphic which is increasingly defined by those material conditions. 
As a result, in many urban sites youth can be seen to constitute a par-
ticular class (Sommers, 2010: 11; Mains, 2011). Nevertheless, while 
asserting the convergences in postcolonial youth situations, I also 
recognise that how young people in general are imagined—whether 
as ‘teenagers,’ ‘adolescents,’ or ‘youth’—is embedded in a confluence 
of local and international power dynamics, and the ‘fire in the bel-
ly’ that motivates their responses to these forces. The political na-
ture of the moniker used to characterize this generation is evident 
in both academic scholarship and public discourse. In these global 
and local fora, young people in the West (with the notable excep-
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tion of black and Latino ‘urban youth’) are for the most part discur-
sively constructed as ‘teenagers’ or adolescents (essentially coy, crea-
tive, and prone to an endearing—because mild, naïve, and ultimately 
inconsequential—rebelliousness), while the identity of their Third 
World—in this case African and black—counterparts (who are also 
typically imagined as male and poor) is ‘youth’—a title that is habitu-
ated to suggest an amorphous group of ‘undesirables’, ‘criminals’ and 
‘subversives’. Ultimately, these pejorative identities trade in anxieties 
about a ‘youth bulge’ or a dangerous ‘lumpenproletariat’ underclass 
that represents a threat to security at home and abroad; the always 
available ‘militia’ and ‘gangs’ ready to do the violent biddings of venal 
politicians (Comaroff and Comarroff, 2000: 307; Fanon, 2001: 130). 
Highlighting the political and oscillating nature of the term youth in 
Kenya, Mathathia (2008) states:
on the streets, we existed as mere statistics. The closest we came to 
acquiring unique identifiers was in a police occurrence book—idlers, 
suspect, Mungiki adherents or Unidentified African Male. Sometimes, 
in election years specifically, we became ‘The youth’ while in NGo lit-
erature we made token appearances as ‘Unemployed youth.’ At some 
point NGos began to refer to us as ‘Marginalized youth’ but then the 
donor funds tended towards the Girl Child’s agenda, so the Girl Child 
became the new Marginalised and we went back to being Unemployed 
youth (Matathia, 2008: 101).
Consequently, even while individual experiences are not homogenous, 
generation remains an important principle of distinction when inves-
tigating how the effects of contemporary political economy (ies) have 
been meted out. Certainly the experiences of this age group are indeed 
variegated, but it is largely the case that postcolonial urban areas are 
the sites of ‘new and alarming forms of youth marginalization and 
exclusion’ (Sommers, 2010: 328-9).
As I have indicated, this generation is often considered both a 
nation’s great promise and plunder, charged currents of both danger 
and change. Embodying this dual capacity in Nairobi and Salvador, 
they are often waged in an intergenerational battle with an older 
and predominantly male leadership who are intent on preserving 
their own power and vitality (rasmussen, 2010; Clark, 2011; Bur-
gess, 2005; Burton and Charton-Bigot, 2010; Vigh, 2010). This cross 
generational relationship is increasingly fraught due to economic 
and socio-cultural disparities across the different age cleavages en-
hanced by persistent neo-patrimonial networks, particularly where 
transitions of power between generations have not been effected—a 
situation that is highly contentious in Kenya where powerful grand-
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fathers still cling to the title of youth (Burgess, 2005: 11; rasmussen, 
2010; Kagwanja, 2005). As these intergenerational negotiations con-
tinue to heat up, youth are often the losers in this battle intensified 
by the dire effects of global neoliberalism (rasmussen, 2010; Biaya, 
2005: 231; Sommers, 2010; Mains, 2011; Cho, 2010; Weiss, 2009; 
Ntarangwi, 2009; Burgess, 2010).
Furthermore, implicit in the machinations of neoliberal democ-
racy, and often regrettably under theorized in Africa’s urban centres, 
is the heightened penalization and surveillance of poor and young 
populations which combine to produce a kind of structural biopoli-
tics in specifically poor geographies (for this in Brazil see: Caldeira, 
1996, 1999; for more on this in the US and Europe see: Giroux, 
2006, 2014; Wacquant, 2001, 2003, 2008; and for more on this in 
Turkey see: yonucu, 2008). one need only turn to the pre-World Cup 
raids in Brazil’s larger cities, or the imprisonment, death, or disap-
pearance of many young men, whether (suspected) Mungiki, Mus-
lim, Somali or poor over the last few years in Kenya (particularly in 
Nairobi and Mombasa), as testament to the nightmares of the broad 
reach of the excessive policing and militarization that comes with 
these processes. This is surveillance and carceralization (and mur-
der) implemented by the state that aims to enforce a ‘penal treat-
ment’ rather than a ‘social treatment’ of poverty and dispossession 
(Wacquant, 2003: 198).2
2 Mungiki is a Kikuyu-centered sociopolitical movement in Kenya that was out-
lawed as a dangerous cult in Kenya following the election of President Mwai Kibaki 
in 2002 (Mungiki, anticipating and desiring a smooth intergenerational transfer of 
power, had supported Kibaki’s rival Kikuyu candidate and President Moi’s hand-
picked successor, Uhuru Kenyatta). The name ‘Mungiki’ means ‘multitude’ in the 
Gikuyu language. It is predominantly a Kikuyu movement that combines religious, 
political, ‘criminal’, and social aspects in the pursuit of what they believe is a bet-
ter Kenyan society. The ‘sect’ was banned in 2002, and since then the police have 
been linked to the disappearance and murder of thousands of Kenyan youth who 
they claim to have suspected of ‘being Mungiki.’ While extra judicial killings by 
the police are normalized in the country—evidenced by the periodic ‘shoot to kill’ 
orders issued at various moments of the nation’s history (for one example see Kag-
wanja, 2005: 107)—very few human rights reports have been able to document the 
frequency and full extent of these killings which occur in an ongoing manner. one 
organization, the oscar Foundation Free Legal Clinic, did release a report in 2008 
that documented at least eight thousand young men had been killed by the police 
in what was, ostensibly, a crackdown on Mungiki in a span of a few years. one year 
after this report was released, human rights lawyer oscar Kingara and his collabora-
tive researcher John Paul oulu were assassinated in what is generally seen to be an 
example of the very extrajudicial killings they sought tirelessly to document. More 
recently, the ‘anti-terror’ raids on Somali and Muslim communities also pay testa-
ment to the militarised nature of the state. Notwithstanding the persistence of state 
violence in Kenya, there is a dearth of academic research on this, and greater efforts 
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Highlighting this, Comaroff and Comaroff (2000) argue that the 
‘sense of physical, social, and moral crisis congeals, perhaps more 
than anywhere else, in the contemporary predicament of youth, now 
widely under scrutiny’ (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000: 306). For these 
reasons, more than any other generation, they are given greater con-
sideration in this exploration of the situated experiences of democracy 
and neoliberalism, and of the effects, alternatives, and transnational 
survival strategies that the current moment produces for them. In at-
tending to age specific experiences in these two urban settings, I also 
recognize that these are gendered and often racialized and ethnicized 
and take on the specific shapes of particular locations. Cities them-
selves often have very gendered and classed histories, and ethno-racial 
nuances also intersect with these class and gender hierarchies. Cur-
rently these factors layer on and have fluctuating salience in the con-
temporary living conditions of most of the population of Nairobi and 
Salvador, and tend to influence the ‘advanced marginality’ of its young 
inhabitants (Wacquant, 2008). 
It is the way that all of this sticks on their bodies—the dynamics 
of demography within current socio-political and economic situa-
tions—that gives youth the power and necessity to reimagine how 
they fit into pervasive national notions of neoliberal democracy. In-
creasingly, the ‘fire’ which tends to characterize these coping strat-
egies is seen as a problem distinctive of postcolonial cities of the 
South, and Nairobi and Salvador are no exception. In such a sce-
nario, while the looming bright lights and civil liberty doctrines of 
the 1990s neoliberal (re)democratization were supposed to provoke 
greater democracy and prosperity for younger generations in South-
ern urban centres, it is now widely documented that it is principally 
these same youth who are excluded from both new fortune and the 
institutions that underpin it. Informed by this exclusion, and by the 
alleged danger that this youth ‘problem’ it is seen to herald, I heed 
the call to examine how youth ‘impertinence’ can be a signifier of 
the contemporary moment, as well as gesture towards new possi-
bilities and trajectories for present and future that are generated 
by their situated anti-normative political and economic practices. 
Therefore, I dwell and delve into their mundane daily life practices 
because I am interested in how these actions could reveal how youth 
make sense of the global political and economic discourses that so 
pervade their public sphere(s), and how they reconfigure them for 
their emancipations. 
need to be made to document and to analyze the relationship between neoliberalism 
and militarization of the state in Africa. 
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A comparison of youth survival strategies in the present also al-
lows us to discern similarities and (dis)junctures in transnational 
youth mobilizations for democracy, as well as how they see their own 
location (or dislocation) within these projects. It may also permit 
future generations in both sites to further recognize their conjoined 
fate(s) and its implications for each other’s lives. The continual ap-
proximation of Brazil and Africa, I have suggested, means that these 
youth are increasingly entrusted with democracy and economic em-
powerment for the other, and the reshaping of what this may look like 
for the days to come.
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DeMocrAcY AND NeolIBerAlIsM
DEMoCrACy IS oNE oF THoSE terms which signal a commenda-
ble egalitarian objective that most people would generally agree with, 
but that has been appropriated in so many forms that its etymologi-
cal implications and practical usage often remain at odds with each 
other. In its pervasive use (and cooptation), it is at once tactile and 
(extremely) elastic. The oxford English Dictionary states that democ-
racy is ‘a system of government by the whole population or all the 
eligible members of a state, typically through elected representatives’ 
(oED, 2014). This definition points towards what is often considered 
the hallmark of democracy and democratization: frequent elections. 
Furthermore, the collapsing of economic borders and the resulting 
unfettered commodification of goods and services that are central to 
our neoliberal present, are also increasingly taken as a metonym for 
democratic ideals.
 While such applications of democracy, elections and ‘laissez faire’ 
economics, are widespread in the recent histories of both Kenya and 
Brazil, the majority of the young people interviewed for this paper 
did not feel that they were in fact living in a democracy, and those 
who did often added that it was only for a rich minority and not for 
the majority of the population that included them. As more than one 
young Brazilian and Kenyan interviewee articulated unhesitatingly, 
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‘it is not practiced here’. Therefore, while there was consensus that a 
fundamentally participatory form of politics was a good idea, they did 
not recognize it in their environment(s). Moreover, they added that 
when it did ostensibly appear, democracy did not hit the ground in 
ways that took them in, and therefore, its various adoptions in the 
public sphere left them curious about its real definition and intent. 
This discordance between ideas of democracy and the way it emerges 
locally contrasts with its popularity over the last few decades; the local 
and global optimism that ‘third world’ locations were taking up such, 
presumably, participatory and non-hierarchical political practice, ver-
sus its actual face on the ground. Highlighting these discrepancies 
Caldeira and Holston (1999) document that since the 1980s more than 
fifty states have adopted political democracy, and also argue that it has 
become ‘a global value adopted by the most diverse societies’ (Caldeira 
and Holston, 1999: 691). Despite the energetic uptake of political de-
mocracy, there are vast contradictions in its localized conduct and 
particularly in regards to the actual ‘civil component of citizenship’ 
which is pursued and that strongly differs to that which is inhered by 
the term democracy (see also Tagle, 2008). With particular reference 
to Brazil, Caldeira and Holston (1999) term this broad inconsistency 
‘disjunctive democracy’, and argue that it is due to Western emphasis 
on political democratization as opposed to a ‘consolidation of democ-
racy that requires social and cultural changes [and] which escape the 
analysis of this narrow political perspective’ (Caldeira and Holston, 
1999: 691-692). 
youth confusion about democracy is further aggravated by the 
fact that many, and perhaps most, political parties and organizations 
in both Kenya and Brazil reference this form of governance in either 
their names or public discourse. They do this while seeking to enact 
particular social relations and forms of governing that cannot all pos-
sibly imply and lead to the same political goal. In Brazil, for instance, 
there are at least five distinct active political parties, of quite differ-
ent political leanings, that include democracy (in various iterations) 
in their party name.1 In Kenya, there are at least thirteen such par-
ties2 and likely many more due to the ‘ephemeral nature of political 
1 Some of these parties, which vary along the political spectrum, are:  Partido So-
cial Democrático (PSD), Demócratas (DEM), Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira 
(PSDB), Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), and the Partido Social 
Democrata Cristão (PSDC). 
2 These include: the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP), Forum for the restauration of De-
mocracy in Kenya (ForD-Kenya), orange Democratic Movement (oDM), Wiper Demo-
cratic Movement (WDM-K), United Democratic Forum Party (UDFP), Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) and the Maendeleo Democratic Party (MDP), among others.
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parties’ in the country (Cheeseman et al., 2013: 6). In light of these 
appropriations of democracy, it is important to raise the question: 
what can young people actually understand about ‘democracy’ if it 
is seemingly integral to many separate political formations that may 
share very little in terms of ideology but which tend to, both tacitly 
and explicitly, exclude real youth participation? Furthermore, what 
can be made of these forms of ‘democratic governance’—pervasive 
in both Brazil and Kenya—that anchor regimes responsible for the 
ongoing and increasing marginalization of this generation? As one 
interviewee in Salvador said:
Democracy is a type of governing that is open to all—at least it is theo-
retically like this. But for us in the black community that reality has 
not been extended. We live in a democracy, but an imaginary democ-
racy, illusory democracy. We black youths do not have access to our 
basic rights, unlike a young middle-class white person who has access 
to the best schools, they have all the necessary financial conditions 
for life and have so much knowledge of the world; they who live their 
whole life in a private school, travelling […] Anyway, it is quite differ-
ent from our reality as black youths from the periphery. But it is even 
more complicated for us to access a college and try to adjust into other 
spaces where there are young people who have had everything in life 
(Caroline, Interview october 1, 2014).
Caroline’s assertion above reveals that for her the democracy which 
is said to exist in Brazil is no democracy at all, particularly as it has 
failed to secure even the most basic rights for the majority of people. It 
is, in her words, ‘illusory’ or ‘imaginary’; a play of light. Furthermore, 
in connecting fundamental economic and social conditions to her ide-
as about democracy she highlights a more material conception of this 
mode of governance, one that was also emphasised by all of the inter-
viewees. For them this should be a political practice that guarantees 
them fundamental socio-economic rights—food, waged employment, 
equal access to schools and freedom from state violence, and that al-
lows them to have presents and futures with these certainties. It is due 
to these multiple reflections and configurations of democracy—from 
those in formalized public space to those in the young periferias of Sal-
vador—that I do not present a single working definition of this term. 
Instead, I attend ethnographically to what is presented here as the rea-
sons for why young people do not see democracy in their contexts, and 
also take these to gesture towards (when it is not explicitly mentioned) 
what they see as real democratic ideals and practices. It is important 
to reassert that these youth rarely referenced their own actions as be-
ing democratic, but indicated, very clearly, why they did not feel that 
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they were living in a democratic milieu. Their ideas rub up against the 
discourses and practices of democracy that have become established 
in their mainstream national political environments; fora that uphold 
the end of dictatorships, frequent elections and the promulgation of 
new constitutions as symbols of  a vibrant democratic present. 
This is not to say that the ideas that these young people present 
about democracy must be different from some of the views normal-
ized in mainstream political fora, but to suggest, rather, that their 
praxis of it is often different. This, however, is not just a difference 
between ideology and praxis. I argue instead that their temporary and 
permanent staging of what they see as this political ideal may inter-
sect with, or may wholly differ from, key democratic metonyms such 
as ‘elections’ or the ‘rule of law.’ And while they are, to an extent, fine 
with what are taken as its traditional propositions mentioned above, 
at the same time they extend them to assert their generations’ priori-
ties. They do not celebrate rubber stamped procedural democracies, 
of mere election acclaim, which do ‘more harm than good’ (Victor, 
personal communication, 2014). 
Listening to the remarks by Kenyan and Brazilian youth (in 
these interviews and beyond—in songs, murmurings, ruminations, 
and in events like the occupy Parliament protests in Kenya and the 
transport protests in Brazil in 2013), there is much dissatisfaction 
with the present, which, as we argue above, is often characterized 
broadly as democratic and neoliberal. recognizing that much of the 
tenor of this article would seem to indicate that the youth of Salvador 
and Nairobi do not feel that they are living in a democratic moment, 
my ethnography of both, what is visible (their social conditions) and 
often invisible (their ideas, desires and projections for the future), 
addresses the point that while notions of democracy may not always 
differ between youth and an older political class the youthful em-
bodied practices enacted for more egalitarian living conditions may 
be very different from those in what is normatively understood to 
constitute the political sphere proper. It is due to these differences, 
contradictions, and at times similarities in local conceptions and 
practices of ‘democracy’ that ethnography becomes an indispensable 
tool in localizing the situations of those who are seen to be the most 
excluded from it. Ethnography will also allow for a more vivid un-
derstanding of the ‘tactical’ and ‘subaltern’ forms of political agency 
(Podder, 2015) that obtain in both Brazil and Kenya. Making visible 
these practices in/of the everyday also allows us to expand and give 
more qualities to the social meanings of what counts as political and 
democratic. Intentionally working with this confusion, I do not give a 
working definition of democracy but rather unpack the ethnograph-
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ic data to reveal themes in what young people take as democratic 
practice(s), as well as the critical potentiality of its reconfigurations 
for their own future(s).
Neoliberalism on the other hand, in contrast to democracy, was a 
term that very few youth in both locations had ever heard of. Unlike 
democracy, it has not been sufficiently established in the glossary of 
local discourse to emerge as an axis through which young people—
particularly those who are less educated and poor—can use to orient 
their lives. Nonetheless, tracing the multi-scalar and multi-temporal 
effects of diverse neoliberal economic interventions on the lives of 
these young people in marginalized urban spaces helps us map out, 
if not the situated meanings of this term, then certainly its manifesta-
tions. In this way, we recognize the apparent overstatement of the im-
portance of the term globally, as Thorsen and Lie (2007) have argued, 
while still identifying the grave impact of what constitutes neoliberal 
policy in both Kenya and Brazil. From the retrenchment and unem-
ployment of their parents (and typically themselves as well) to high 
tuition fees, transport and food prices, we can trace the effects that 
the expansion of neoliberal horizons have had on the trajectories of 
young people in both of these places. Cognizant of this disproportion-
ate effect on this generation, one Kenyan youth stated that ‘neoliber-
alism affects the youth most because you find that if you privatize an 
organization people will lose their jobs, and it is the youth. And this 
is what makes them get into drugs and crime’ (Muthuri, interview 
August 29, 2014).
As with democracy, then, I am less interested in developing a 
working definition of neoliberalism—as argued above it is not a term 
that is a ‘seamark’ in the lives of young people—but rather to use what 
can analytically be taken as its spatial and temporal formations, and 
in doing so to interrogate how it has moulded the lives of the young 
people in question. Pursuing such a trajectory, neoliberalism can be 
interpreted, at once, as a ‘social catastrophe’ which ‘mercantilizes all 
social rights’, or in another young person’s eyes (for whom it was a 
recognizable category): ‘I don’t see neoliberalism bringing a praça 
where people can go with their children’ (S, personal communication 
September 14, 2014). By resisting a working definition of neoliberal-
ism and, instead, teasing out its norms and nuances through uphold-
ing multiple experiences of it, I would like to privilege all of these 
diverse perspectives that give meaning(s) to this term on the ground.
reseArch MethoDs
This research builds on work that I have been fortunate to do and 
reflect on over the last eight years in both Kenya and Brazil. To un-
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derstand in more the complicated ways youth experiences with de-
mocracy and neoliberalism, my research assistants and I were able to 
conduct interviews and do participant observation, both formally and 
informally, with thirty-five youth in Brazil and Kenya. These young 
people are all from marginalized areas, and are representative of dif-
ferent genders, educational backgrounds and, more particular to Ken-
ya, ethnicities. Moreover, during the research process we also built on 
our own experiences of being young in these two countries, which, in 
our different embodiments, is both similar as well as distinct in ways 
that will become clear below. 
The kinds of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) associated with 
ethnographic work were indispensable to this project as consistent 
review allowed for patterns to surface from the qualitative data that 
upheld the importance of all matter  in the everyday experiences of 
young people. We also collected short life histories of participants 
and the gathering of brief biographies during these interviews, and 
guided loosely by research questions,3 allowed for a deeper study 
into how the present moment, broadly categorized as neoliberal and 
democratic, shapes the lives of poor urban youth in both Brazil and 
Kenya. In addition, they helped clarify the various shades of class, 
race and gender that persist in—and are transformed by—these 
changed settings. 
Throughout this research exercise I also paid close attention to 
the mediums of creative life such as songs, poetry and dramaturgy 
that many young people use to express themselves—all phenomena 
that give intensely affective insights into both what shapes them most 
acutely as subjects, and, also, their ideas about political life. Further-
more, I followed the various ‘evenemential’ displays of their dissat-
isfaction in both Kenya and Brazil (for example, the passe livre and 
anti-World Cup protests in Brazil, and the occupy Parliament and 
anti-tuition fee hike protests in Kenya). Having friends, acquaintances 
and colleagues who were involved in some of these demonstrations, 
I was able to have extensive conversations about the significance of 
these movements and the deep underlying issues and frustrations 
from which they emerged. Literature both academic and non-aca-
demic supported and informed these musings and offered broader 
3 This research was guided by five key questions in and which informed the in-
terview process. These are: 1) What do youth think about their lives? 2) What kind of 
individual and collective struggles (even in organizations/movements/groups) do they 
enter in to make their lives better? 3) What do they think of democracy? 4) Have they 
ever heard of neoliberalism? If so what are their thoughts? And finally, 5) What impor-
tant messages and strategies for bettering the future would they share with their peers in 
Brazil /Kenya and elsewhere?
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historical, geographic and anthropological moorings. Throughout his 
process, I acknowledged the necessity to be critically reflexive of my 
own position as a middle class Kenyan female who could, potentially 
at least, be read as one kind of material representation of the neolib-
eral democracy under investigation.
I believe it is irresponsible not to be aware of this positioning 
and of the tensions that this can produce in any research endeav-
our. I am confident, however, that the mixed methods approach em-
ployed, building as it does on significant amounts of time spent in 
both countries, participation in youth practices, and the privileging 
of self-narration in the life histories allowed the voices of these young 
Kenyans and Brazilians to come through. This is particularly impor-
tant in light of current state practices that disregard their expressions 
and survival efforts, and often in more violent ways than previous 
non-democratic regimes.4 
NAIroBI / Nairobbery / Naibeggary / Nai-rob-me / greeN cItY  
IN the suN
What follows is a brief history of Nairobi, which is overlaid with 
historical events from Kenya’s past in order to contextualize the 
city and the social and politico-economic forces which continue to 
shape it.
The city of Nairobi is, in many ways, central to the modern 
history of Kenya. Situated half way between Kampala and Mom-
basa, Nairobi was originally considered a mere stop on the way to 
serving more important British interests of commerce and coloniza-
tion in Uganda. White’s (1990) brief historicization of this Kenyan 
metropolis confirms that it was formed in 1899 when the railhead 
reached ‘the place of cool waters’—enkare nyrobi, as it was known 
by the Maasai.
4 Authors like Silva de Almeida (2002) and Caldeira and Holston (1999) talk about 
the significant increase in violence in Brazil since the end of the dictatorship and the 
establishment of ‘democracy.’ The increase in both state and other forms of violence 
takes on a particular gravity for those who are young, poor, black and favelada, and is 
coupled with the ‘precarious’ structural social situation that Paixao (2004) examines. 
This is also evidenced in Kenya and some of these trends are mentioned earlier in 
this paper. Highlighting this proliferation in youth killings by police and other state 
machinery in Kenya since the reinstitution of ‘democracy,’ one interviewee whose 
brother was killed by the police said to me: ‘if you want to know how many people are 
killed by the police go and ask the city mortuary how many police vans come by every 
day’ (G, personal communication November 24, 2014). This is a very grave testament 
to the frequency and normalization of state violence, and one that that lies in sharp 
contrast to the state’s claims (and the claims made for it by others) that it upholds 
democratic ideals.
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After 1899, efforts were soon directed towards creating order 
from this savannah landscape, as it was to be the initial location of 
permanent European occupation. This ordering was necessary to cre-
ate an outpost that would facilitate resource extraction and the crea-
tion of a sunny, and incorrigibly, British home away from home. It is 
important to note that while this city was ‘new,’ it grew from accretion 
as many of its future sites were built on, and grew from, existing Af-
rican villages such as Kileleshwa and Buruburu; locations that retain 
their names to this day (White, 1990). 
By 1901, the city had eight thousand people, and in 1906, it had 
thirteen thousand residents of primarily African, Indian and Euro-
pean origin. This growth in the urban population, and principally the 
African demographic, had much to do with a series of catastrophes 
that preceded and followed the establishment of Nairobi in 1899. Es-
pecially important in this regard were the rinderpest scourges of 1889 
and 1901 that decimated large stocks of cattle throughout the country, 
provoking increased urbanization as many came to the city to find 
some form of material sustenance with which they hoped to, eventu-
ally, replenish these losses (White, 1990: 30).
In addition, others came to Nairobi to raise money for the hut 
tax which was first imposed in 1902 by the colonial administration, 
and were also escaping from famine, dispossession and the changing 
social relations of the time provoked by the relentless incorporation 
of rural African life, public and intimate, into a capitalist economy. 
Due to the variety of their motivations, as well as the surveillance and 
hostility, they faced while in the city, many of these migrants did not 
always stay in Nairobi.
A number of those who remained and shaped both the geogra-
phy and social relations in this urban were imperial African military 
forces from other British ‘outposts’ such as Sudan and Ghana. These 
soldiers were brought to Kenya as military regiments during the First 
and Second World War. It is also important to note that many of 
the earliest African settlers in Nairobi were female sex workers who 
came to the city to ‘dig with their backs’ so that their primarily rural, 
though increasingly urban, households could be sustained (White, 
1990). In this capacity, they accumulated enough to build houses that 
were both their sites of work and the rental abodes of migrant work-
ers. Furthermore, by performing somewhat ‘spousal’ roles to the men 
who visited them, they were able to ensure that the male migrant 
working class—who really were the majority of the population of 
Nairobi albeit on the margins—could stay in the city. These roles ac-
commodated some of the established gendered needs of these male 
migrants who would desire less and less to go back to family life in 
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the rural areas; a situation acknowledged by the colonial state with 
mixed and fluctuating sentiment.
European settlement was encouraged by the protectorate’s sec-
ond commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot (1901-4), as Mother England was 
anxious to get back debt accrued from building the railway and, con-
comitantly, also to extend the reaches of the British empire (White, 
1990: 35). This settlement was bolstered by narratives of a ‘white 
man’s country’; of abandon and lordship over natives and nature 
(Jackson, 2011). As a result, by 1914, the core of this ‘green city in the 
sun’ became primarily European, and this was only to change during 
the years that marked the dawn of independence. The South Asian 
descendants, the ‘colonized middle’ (Myers, 2003), were brought to 
Nairobi as, primarily, indentured labourers to build the railway. They 
were also the ‘in between’ class in the colony. In this regard, pheno-
typically, socially, geographically and commercially, they were to be 
important ‘buffers’, employees of empire who, for their most part, 
could be used as such by virtue of their ‘mid-level subject positions’ 
(Myers 2003:27). 
As mentioned above, and similar to other African cities estab-
lished from within the British imperial enterprise, Nairobi was imag-
ined as a tabula rasa, a terra nullius, which necessitated an ordering 
that would render it legible to those who now occupied this space. 
Towards these ends, the resultant architectural, infrastructural, and 
administrative organization also made imperative racial compart-
mentalization and surveillance. While, to an extent, postcolonial Nai-
robi was to be de-racialized, the displacement, immiseration, and 
discontent that independence was meant to have quelled continues 
unabated to the present; is material and affectively layered in the to-
pography of the city. Therefore, the postcolonial African city, while en-
gulfed in a myriad of political, social and economic orientations that 
go off in many directions, nevertheless, is oriented by these origins; 
still remains a site for the exercise of the dominance of the state as it 
was in the colonial period. related, while the threats of displacement 
have always loomed large for many of the city’s ‘informal’ settlement 
residents, these took on a more pronounced gravity since the 1980s. 
This is as land in the city gradually became a more obvious interface 
for the conjunction of politics, ethnicity, neoliberalism and genera-
tional contestations (Klopp, 2008; obala and Mattingly, 2013). As a 
result, this city remains a site of continual battles; proxy or stated, 
democratic or otherwise. 
As argued above, Nairobi—or whatever playful moniker it goes 
by these days—has not fully ruptured itself from the coloniality 
of its past. Scholars have shown that the discriminatory racial, 
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classed, and gendered ideals that underscored these spatial prac-
tices are still easily recognized in the city’s organization (see Hake, 
1976; Charton-Bigot, 2010; De Lame, 2010). As a consequence, 
Nairobi remains a city replete with colonial scaffoldings, while at 
the same time immersed in postcolonial daring, polyphony and 
excess—a type of ‘postcolonial pastiche’ that, like its monuments, 
borrows and is inspired from multiple and contradictory histories 
(Larsen, 2011, 2012). 
For its residents, then, it becomes a city that is both yielding and 
unyielding, an urban sphere where as many doors are open as are 
closed and where all sorts of miracles of survival take place for the 
majority of its three million inhabitants. In this regard, and as Hake 
(1976) and De Lame (2010) describe, in its postcolonial incarnation 
Nairobi is both a place of unimaginable prosperity and concomitantly 
a brash ‘self-help city’ of ‘don’t-die survival’. It is then simultaneously 
conjured as ‘Nairobbery’, ‘Nai-beggary’ and ‘Green city in the sun’; 
an abundance of seemingly incongruous monikers that have become 
etched in the landscape, and which charge it with much material and 
psychic cadence. 
Its various geographies can signal environs that look like they 
were modelled on the rolling pastures of an English countryside 
complete with residences that replicate the pomp and pageantry of 
antiquated British nobility. At the same time, Nairobi is a city that 
breeds hypermodern architectures that mimic those in other neo-
liberal urban territories, and whose incidence is only set to increase 
with the gradual implementation of the recently proposed Integrated 
Urban Development Master Plan for the city of Nairobi 2014-2030 
(NIUPLAN).5 These present and proposed constructions—seemingly 
from a familiar and futuristic neoliberal architectural toolbox—in-
clude, for example, skyscrapers, hotels, factories, super highways and 
shopping malls. Nonetheless, when both of these colonial and hyper-
modern architectures end, often abruptly, they give way to the many 
jarring realities of poor urban life in Nairobi. These numerous areas 
of exclusion are the immiserated parts of the city where, as Muehle-
bach (2013) observes, things ‘fall apart again’ and again, and where 
the population density per acre of land is, at least, twenty times those 
of more affluent neighbourhoods (Hake, 1976: 27). Furthermore, Si-
5 The proposed NIUPLAN 2014-2030 is the second post-independence master plan 
for Nairobi. The preliminary study for this plan was supported by the Japanese Inter-
national Cooperation Agency (JICA). In its hallowed focus on the investment poten-
tials of the city, this plan definitely emerges from within prevailing neoliberal impera-
tives, which have been privileged by the Kenyan state since the 1980s.
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mone (2004) has shown that this ‘inner city’ is typically a place where 
rarely any significant urban policy or programming has taken place 
for a considerable amount of time (Simone, 2004: 423). And which is, 
similar to Brazil, seen as the justification for the ‘city of walls’ and ‘for-
tified enclaves’ that Caldeira (1996, 1999) discusses; erected by those 
who seek to be furthest away from all that may emanate from these 
sullying places long associated with crime, darker skin, poverty, and 
lack of order (Alves and Evanson, 2011: 23).
 It is from these neighbourhoods that our young Kenyans 
come. They come shaped by the coeval histories of both colonialism 
and the ‘lost decades’ of neoliberalism. This most recent neoliberal 
period is one which was stewarded by Daniel Arap Moi, the second 
and longest serving president of Kenya, and continued by subsequent 
‘democratic’ administrations. Their narratives below will demonstrate 
how young lives are fashioned and suffused by complex political, eco-
nomic and spatial histories that are made worse by neoliberal democ-
racy and its attendant violence(s), such as the penalization and sur-
veillance of poor urban populations (Wacquant, 2001; Giroux, 2006: 
181). Additionally, these experiences also explicitly describe the strug-
gles that youth enact for both the present and future, and the many 
hopeful and imaginative survival tactics that they want to share with 
their peers whose lives are also solidly embedded within both local 
and global neoliberal and democratic frontiers.
‘DeMocrAcY Is for the rIch’6 voIces froM Youth IN KeNYA
The individual excerpts below are presented as one continuous narra-
tive although they were responses to particular semi-structured ques-
tions asked during the interview process. These questions influenced 
the sequence of information generated and therefore a pattern, shaped 
by these questions, will be evident in the accounts below. While some 
questions differed in each city, the bulk of these, guided by the three 
research questions mentioned earlier and attended to in both Kenya 
and Brazil, were:
1. What is your name? 
2. Where do you live?
3. How long have you lived there?
4. What do you do to make a living?
5. What is life like?
6 Gachihi Gachihi, interview october 15, 2014.
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6. Is it better or worse than before?
7. What is life like for youth in your area?
8. Have you ever heard of democracy and if so what are your 
thoughts?
9. Have you ever heard of neoliberalism and if so what are your 
thoughts?
10. Do you think democracy and neoliberalism are good things? 
For you? For youth?
11. What do you do as an individual or in a group to make life bet-
ter? Why do you do it?
12. What dreams do you have for the future? 
13. What advice, message or strategy for making life better would 
you give to other youth in Kenya/Brazil and around the world?
Seventeen interviews were conducted in Nairobi however, only five are 
used at length below. Two are from females, and three are from male 
interviewees. The other youth narratives are referred to in various 
places throughout this paper and were also central to the data analysis 
process. It is important to note that most of these conversations were 
conducted with youth from various poor urban settlements in the 
East of the city, particularly in Mathare. other participants were also 
drawn from Ruai, Dandora, Huruma and Kariobangi. I have sought to 
contain, to the extent that I am able to, the actual phrasings that were 
used by the youth, and believe that as they are they still allow for their 
ideas to come across; for the sentience of their lived experiences, and 
nuanced expressions of these, to emerge.
frANcIs
I have lived here in Mathare for about 12 years. I sell phone acces-
sories. Life is okay if you have a business like mine. I can say it’s not 
good and not bad, it’s just fair. Not bad. If you can have the basic needs 
you can say life is not so bad, but given a chance I would wish to live 
a better life than the one I have. Life is not enough. For youths life is 
hard because people are engaging in criminal activity because of pov-
erty, lack of funds, idleness and lack of jobs. If you don’t have money 
you find yourself engaging in some bad activities, it’s not by choice. 
you need money to survive. you find someone with a kid and he or she 
doesn’t know what to do and the family needs to eat. Because of this 
they are forced to engage in unlawful activities, because the govern-
ment is not helping them. Life in the past was simple because I used 
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to live with my parents and everything was being provided for, and so 
life was easy. 
Crime was so high in the past, but in the present there are some 
jobs created by the government such as Kazi Kwa Vijana [Jobs for 
youth] which have reduced the crime rate, and so life has changed a 
little bit for the better. Still, even with these jobs, the life of a youth 
is difficult because they have to do things contrary to what the gov-
ernment likes; selling marijuana and robbery, and that takes them to 
prison. And that is the life the youths are living, most of the youths; 
selling marijuana, stealing and anything that can lead you to prison.
I have heard of the word democracy while watching the television, 
but it is not practiced here. My understanding is that with democracy 
things are done fairly; you are free to do anything and your rights 
are not infringed. I have no idea about neoliberalism. From what you 
explain, yes, there are instances where such things take place. For 
instance, there is a man called Waweru who was contracted by the 
Nairobi Water company to employ the youths of this area. What he 
did, he travelled to his rural village and brought youths from there 
here and gave them the jobs. The youths from this area were supposed 
to benefit but because of him and other women, he decided to make 
only a few people, who he chose, benefit. If I say we have democracy, 
I mean in Kenya and not in Mathare because that doesn’t exist here. 
When meetings are called, there are people that have a bigger say than 
others [do] even if they are not making sense, and if you try and ex-
press your opinion it may not be taken into consideration. For exam-
ple, the individuals of one group who are working in conjunction with 
village elders have more say here than anyone else. There is that con-
nection between the village elder and these people which makes them 
think that they are superior, and so many people don’t like them. one 
of the members of the county assembly has the right plan but he has 
never gone to all the parts of Mathare to find the right and trustworthy 
people. Also those that were working with the previous governments 
are old but they are still here, and they are not giving the youth the 
chance to work with this government.
To make my life better I am saving so I can expand my business, 
raise my kids well and make my family happy. To start my business I 
was given a loan by my parents. It was hard to pay it back. I used to 
pay back the loan with the profit from the business and consume the 
remaining money, and so saving was a problem at the beginning and 
expanding the business was difficult due to the lack of finances. Also 
I was selling very few products and lending frequently to customers, 
and sometimes some customers disappear when they know they have 
a big debt. Tracing them is hard, and this is a challenge.
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I am part of Ostrom youth group. There are things we have to 
do; if we get donors, we supply sanitary pads to girls in another area 
called Kosovo because we want to save the youth. We are at the initial 
stages of things, but we are currently doing savings. We registered a 
few months ago and we are done writing the constitution. I joined the 
group because we say it is good to help the youth of Mathare. When 
the group expands, we will create jobs through, for example, garbage 
collection which will ensure that the youths are not idle. our group 
faces challenges like funding. When you tell people to contribute, they 
find it hard to donate because they are jobless and they only have the 
little which they get and which they eat. So, the group is still stagnant.
My dreams for the future are to be a successful businessman and 
have a happy family. I also encourage people to join groups and involve 
themselves in things that can help the community both as individuals 
and as a group. I know life is hard, but patience is more important. It 
may take long to bear fruits but finally it will come.
AchIeNg
I am 25 and have lived in Huruma since I was born. I do a lot of things; 
I am a blogger and a community facilitator. Life is very hard, and if 
you can’t afford the basic needs it looks very hard. Initially we used to 
buy some basic needs, like milk and bread, with 50 shillings but now 
you cannot buy them with that much, you have to add more money. If 
you go shopping with a thousand shillings, you cannot buy so many 
things. you will end up with few things in your basket.
Back then, I was young and I used to get everything from my 
parents, and so I thought life was easy. Now I am a grown up and 
live alone and so I have to do a lot to make ends meet. People have to 
squeeze themselves with the little they are earning, and saving is very 
hard because people use all of their money. Life is hard now compared 
to previously. It has changed.
youths are people between the ages of 18 and 40. They make up 
the biggest percentage of Kenya. The job market is not taking youth 
because they think they are not ready for work. A lot of youths are 
graduating and they are not getting work or a job in the profession 
they qualified for. Those that did not go to school are engaging in 
drugs, robbery and in some indecent work that is not paying. By in-
decent work I mean that young girls are engaging in prostitution in 
nearby estates, and the men are carrying heavy loads, collecting bot-
tles and washing them to sell, and so they make a living from that. The 
life of a Kenyan youth is not okay, they are struggling.
From the word democracy I understand that it means having your 
freedom, freedom of speech, and being included in decision making. 
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It is my democratic right to vote. If someone is democratic it means 
their human rights are not infringed. Not everyone is democratic be-
cause we just had our by-election in Mathare and not everyone came 
out to vote; they don’t have love for the country. A lot of youths cannot 
be considered democratic if they are being recruited to join al-shabaab 
and then they return home to terrorize their country. In Kenya, the 
only people that think they are democratic are the politicians and the 
rich. Whatever they are saying is being implemented, because they are 
people with a say in the government.
I have heard of neoliberalism. It is where the resources of a coun-
try are being shared only with specific persons. For example specific 
resources which are used specifically for specific people. The specific 
people will always benefit, like the rich and not the poor. For example, 
in Kenya Kibera and Mathare are known to be the places of people 
who are not well off, and Runda and Kileleshwa are for the rich. It is 
the rich who will always benefit.
Democracy is a good thing if everyone is included. It is good 
depending on whose side it is favouring. If it is a poor person being 
protected it is good. Like if there is a bill in parliament discussing 
the people from the informal settlement it is bad if it does not focus 
on us, but if it focuses on the people from the slum it is good. If 
it is for the few it is bad. Democracy and neoliberalism affect the 
youth because they are the biggest percentage of the people in the 
country, and so the ideas of the youths should be included in all of 
these things.
I do a lot of things to make life better because you cannot sit 
down and expect life to be better, and so I have to work. Through the 
articles that I write, I am trying to bring the other picture of the slum 
that the media houses are not telling. When we appreciate the little 
that is there, we can’t continue complaining; no matter how little we 
have we take with thanksgiving. If you go to other countries the same 
is happening, hardship is happening there and so we need to appreci-
ate the little we have in our lives.
I am not satisfied with life and that’s why I am striving hard. I am 
not in the position I want myself to be in. I have to work extra hard 
and read things that change my mindset. I belong to a group called 
Madoya Tumaini Youth Group. We formed the group after the post-
election violence when people were divided along their tribal lines. 
And so, we saw the need of bringing them together because these were 
people who we had grown up with. We had not attained the age of vot-
ing and so we thought ‘why are we even fighting amongst ourselves’ 
especially when we can’t even vote? So, we decided to come together 
and form a group.
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Together we engage in garbage collection, planting of trees and 
bamboo plants, educating and counselling the young girls who are 
dropping out of school and training them in entrepreneurship and 
savings. We also partner with other groups and organizations to 
do advocacy. Inuka Kenya [a local NGo] asked our organization to 
mobilize youths so that they can educate them about the constitu-
tion, and especially on the referendum. We have been doing a lot 
of civic education and educating the youths and community about 
getting tested [for HIV/Aids] and the use of condoms. We have 
also been doing environmental advocacy; trying to inform them of 
the importance of keeping the environment clean. We also do this 
through clean ups.  
The only leaders we put to task are our office bearers [MPs and 
members of county assemblies - MCAs], but we do not put national 
leaders to task. The only task we can do is voting them out however, 
most of the time you will find us talking without doing any actions. As 
an individual or a group, you can still put them to task through the use 
of social media and in this way make them answerable. 
young people in Kenya and the world should know that we are 
strong and so being the largest population we need to work when we 
are still young because we will not do it when we are aged, and we 
need to make a stronger foundation for our kids. The youths need 
to think beyond garbage collection, car washing and pulling of carts. 
We need to think big! If you are only thinking about these kinds of 
jobs, which I call petty, the community starts thinking that we are not 
responsible and they should not look up to us as responsible citizens. 
We don’t need to do petty jobs. Think big and you will act big.
Furthermore, the government should reduce the fees for starting 
a business to ensure that everyone invests. The levies should not be 
higher than the capital that one is able to use to start and save. Also 
the business environment should be friendly and welcoming, espe-
cially to starters; where I am sure of my safety and that of my goods. 
Now the government in power promised to create jobs for the youth 
but still the older people who are tired are still working, while the 
youths graduating are not consumed by the job market. And whatever 
the government has done it is not to my expectation. What they should 
do is that 50% of youths should be guaranteed employment, and then 
the rest should be engaged in entrepreneurship.
But so many youths are dropping out of school! The youths are 
not given the chance and older people have a bad perception of the 
youth. Also many have not gone to school and so that prevents young 
people from doing business. The older generation thinks that youths 
are not qualified and the youths think they are fine to do it all. The 
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older are the more experienced; they are the owner or manager who 
look at you like you are young and not qualified when you go and 
look for a job, and they also judge you due to the area where you 
come from.
For my future I would like to get married, have kids and take 
them to good schools. I would also like to invest in a good business, 
and be a good citizen.
MArY
My name is Mary. I am 30 years old and I am from Kiamaiko. I am a 
salonist [hairdresser] and do a few other jobs here and there. Life is 
hard for people like us who are not employed. Still we go on working 
and the little I get I consume all of it, yet I am expected to save so that 
I can pay rent. 
The male youth are at risk because they need to be smart and 
live a life beyond their normal life. And because they don’t have a job, 
they are forced to go stealing and that’s where they are gunned down. 
For the girls they go looking for a job and then they end up getting 
pregnant and sick; some are even involved in prostitution. young girls 
are widowed because the people they call their husbands are gunned 
down when they go stealing. The youths are dying; they get killed and 
soon we will not have that age group. So life is very hard.
I know of democracy as a political party. I only know of the Dem-
ocratic Party, but I don’t know very much. I hear politicians say we 
are bringing democracy to the community. They mean that they are 
going to bring good to people in the community. This is usually during 
political campaigns. In these campaigns, they usually say democracy 
which I think means good life. To my mind, neoliberalism sounds like 
something rebellious and seems to mean ‘people who are against what 
is there.’ I don’t know if that is what it means. Democracy is a good 
thing but neoliberalism isn’t. Democracy means peace in the commu-
nity but neoliberalism is not [peace]. 
To make life better I do a little bit of work here and there. Myself 
and a few girls came together to form a group. We go to houses and 
ask to wash their clothes. We ask a lot of girls to come and join us, so 
in our area girls are busy with these jobs.
I have registered the group. We are also creating awareness on 
health rights; we empower young women and inform the youth on 
what they are supposed to do. We do follow up on gender issues or 
community issues through the proper channel. And we also get into 
the details of these young women’s lives. My dreams are to live a bet-
ter life, for the community […] other members to live a better life. For 
me this means a life where I can receive help from the people around 
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me and also where we can be helping each other. The advice I have for 
youths in Kenya and the world is don’t sit down and wait to be helped, 
stand up and do a lot. Look for a job that you are capable of doing 
without being pushed or being choosy.
thuo
I am selling fruit juice and I am a computer programmer. I did IT and 
programming and so we as a group take contracts from schools and 
companies; we make websites for them then we receive the pay. Life to 
me, personally, is fair depending on what I do and my determination. 
Life was a bit harder in the past because there were no resources, but 
at the moment there are resources that NGos and the government 
have chipped in, though not to our expectation. I mean if you have an 
idea you can implement it with the funds from the government, and 
though hard to access them it is better than earlier days. Life is not 
good for youths where I am from because most of the youths don’t 
know how to make it in life; they don’t have the mentality and they 
don’t have ideas. They are not educated. They engage in drugs and 
theft and so their lifestyle is not good.
I have heard of the term democracy from former president Kiba-
ki. I have never heard of it anywhere else. It means having openness, 
transparency and fairness and respecting the rights of the people. It is 
taking place though the effect is very little and hard to feel. Its effect is 
so low, such that you can’t feel it happening.
I have never heard of the term neoliberalism. If people are not 
involved […] it looks like a government issue yet it is supposed to be 
shared with all the citizens. It is like there is barrier with the informa-
tion; it doesn’t reach citizens. It affects me as an individual because it 
is my right to receive information yet it doesn’t reach me, and through 
government engagement with us there may be resources that can 
come and help the community. And so to me it hinders a lot if there is 
no information. Now is the time when democracy and neoliberalism 
are picking up. A lot of people have not understood the two. It is high 
time the government engages the people and educates them on the 
two things and how they should use them.
If you compare, accessing funds was harder in the olden days, 
and now getting loans from banks is easy, and also the loan rates have 
been lowered. The NGos are here to engage the people with different 
ideas, and so as an individual, I take advantage of that and take part 
in their different activities.
I am the manager of ostrom youth group. We do many things 
such as have a football academy, and we expose people through ex-
change programs. We also visit the sick in Kenyatta hospital, we 
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engage the youth through educating them on the effects of drugs, 
the dangers of pre-marital sex and we support them to start a busi-
ness by giving funds and encouraging them. To run the group we 
contribute money amongst ourselves that comes from group activi-
ties, and we have donors as well. We are now encouraging more and 
more youth to come and save. We also do business, and the business 
we do is we all contribute some money that goes to the business 
account for individual and group projects. We also get funds from 
donors in the Netherlands. Everyone is involved in decision-mak-
ing, not just the office bearers, and we reach consensus by debating 
amongst the members.
My dreams are to have a big business around the central busi-
ness district (CBD) and own a house and ranch. If the project grows, 
we expect to engage the young people that are growing now because 
they are the future. I hope in the future that we as a group will be able 
to change the lives of the young people by having on board a large 
percentage of youths from here. What I would share with other youth 
is that life is you and it is not hard; it is all about how you are keep-
ing busy and the activities you do in life. really, you can be what you 
want to be. It doesn’t matter where you come from or where you are; 
no matter your background or your money abilities. Life is about you 
and what you want to be in life.
The government plays a role in making the youths engaged and 
their lives better, but right now very minimally. I would like to urge the 
government to involve the youths more through other youth activities. 
They can do this by creating chances and resources.
otIeNo
My name is otieno and I am 28. I live in Madoya which is the slum 
that is neglected. I am a community worker and I am also working 
with the organization that is called the Japan Center for Conflict Pre-
vention (JCCP) as a security focal person. I report security incidents 
that happen in the community. We are reporting these incidents to 
avoid repeating the 2007/2008 election violence scenario. I also run a 
small restaurant with my dad. I am also into activism, and I was part 
of the team that was fighting big people to stop land grabbing in our 
area. We did this with the help of Amnesty International organization. 
I was also part of Bunge la Mwananchi [the people’s parliament].7
7 The people’s parliament is a grassroots group of diverse Kenyans who come and 
meet under a tree in a public park in Nairobi, and talk about a variety of topical pub-
lic issues. They have also been involved in various national advocacy campaigns. For 
more information, see: Kimari and rasmussen (2010).
And so the youth fire rAged on youth And prActices of democrAcy...
52
I feel like youth have been excluded from the main forms of gov-
ernance. Also the agenda of employability is long gone from the gov-
ernment’s agenda. Also if you look at the NGos or the civil society 
they don’t talk about the youth. It is a divide and rule scenario here so 
life is hard. I am taking a look at the future; in three years to come we 
will be struggling and the reason is because it will be a lot harder for 
the youth as there will be no employment. The government wants to 
retrench people. And the youth are lied to concerning the government 
tenders they were to be given.  
The problem is also with the youths themselves, some are igno-
rant while others just wait for handouts. you find some youths just 
seated around while chewing miraa [khat] and they say that they will 
be owners of a storied building but they don’t take the initiative to 
save! I think there should be awareness creation and advocacy. We 
sometimes hold community youth forums but not often in Madoya. 
There is one in Ngei on community policing and the other is done by 
JCCP. There is not always a youth forum in Madoya and so we usually 
go to the ones done in other places because the question is: who will 
attend in Madoya? As an individual, I can attend the forums, but my 
friends will ask how long it will take and if there will be some form 
of payment afterwards. I blame it on the NGos that come here, play 
with our minds and then give us 500 shillings afterwards. This has 
made the public know that there is always money involved in these 
NGos forums.
I am a member of a group though and the group is called Tu-
maini Youth Group. We have bathrooms that we rent to people, we 
sell water and now we make furniture using bamboo that we have 
planted along the river. We have tried as hard as we could to recruit 
people but the turnout is still poor in the group, maybe six or seven 
people. The reason for this is that we don’t give money to people to 
work with us.
What should be done is that first, the government must take the 
initiative of looking into the welfare of the youth. That is looking into 
micro-finance, starting projects for the youth and giving the youth 
loans to start a business at no interest. The NGos and civil society 
should also be helping. And they should not ask for funds from donors 
in the name of the youths, and do nothing for them. Like the African 
youth Trust, they were here for maybe six weeks, made us fill out some 
forms and then they disappeared. 
Life is 50/50. That is, some have jobs, some are active in business 
and income generating activities like shoe shining and running videos 
shows. But the others ones are just chewing miraa. Miraa is life to 
them and that’s the reason why they get into crime.
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I have heard of democracy yes, it’s all about good governance; 
that is citizens being governed as they should and that the government 
gives an ear to the grievances of the people. Neoliberalism? yes I heard 
about it from Professor okoth okomo when I attended a seminar on 
leadership and campaign strategies for six months, and he touched on 
some terminologies but he wasn’t so clear on their meaning, so I still 
do not know the significance of neoliberalism.
I think we lack proper policies in that the policy or guidelines that 
are being used in the privatization process do not involve the ordinary 
citizen. The policies only benefit a few people, and even if you go to 
court, you will not win. What we need to do is look into the policies of 
the companies so that they don’t benefit a few. Democracy is good for 
the youths but neoliberalism […] I think it is also good because the 
most important thing for us, the youth, is advocacy.
To make life better, as an individual, I create awareness like I told 
you earlier and I also pass employment information to the youth in 
my group. To be honest though, I don’t see any real initiatives. For 
now, we create employment from the growing of bamboo and making 
furniture from the same bamboo. The youths we work with under-
went some training and this helps us.
In the future I would like to see awareness creation for the youth, 
and the government taking initiative on the issue of youth employ-
ability even if it is not for all of the youths, but something to make 
the youths stop being idle. I have a dream that things will get better. 
Even Martin Luther had a dream that came to pass, but it depends 
on the time frame so probably in 20 years to come. In Kenya, the gap 
between the poor and the rich is so big and that’s why we are ranked 
top ten in the world for income differences. And this is the govern-
ment’s failure. Look at the initiative that was taken by Mandela in 
South Africa? People now are at par with each other there. So we need 
leaders who are capable of pushing for reform, not just theirs but for 
the whole population.
Because there are no jobs, I would advise the youth to join mi-
cro-finance groups, as well as other groups. Like ourselves, we have 
a group of seven and we each contribute 70 shillings every week, and 
this enables us to access loans as low as 50,000 shillings. So long as 
we have a good business plan life will change. And it is not a must 
that you need a lot of money to start a big business. Joyce started as 
a charcoal seller but just look at where she is now. The only problem 
with the youth is that they want big things.
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‘the lIfe of A KeNYAN Youth  
Is Not oKAY, theY Are strugglINg’
AS THE NArrATIVES ABoVE CoNVEy, young people in Kenya are 
struggling. These are their experiences within the processes of de-
mocratization that have been ongoing for over twenty two years,1 and 
one of the watershed events that marked the beginning and the sup-
posed gains of this trajectory were the multiparty elections in 1992. 
While they have heard of the hegemonic democracy that pervades 
their national political spheres, and are often accused of threatening 
it, they have not felt in their lives. In contrast to its purported gains, 
for them it has opened up and is appropriated locally in ways that in 
practice have excluded them; it does not extend beyond the television. 
Whereas in its limited normative meaning and practice it is never-
theless still, taken to reference participation, representation, and fair 
1 After a 10 year ban on other parties President Moi, in response to both local pres-
sures from civil society groups and international pressure for ‘good governance’ that 
occurred  in tandem with Structural Adjustment Programs, revoked the 1982 amend-
ment in the Constitution that upheld single party rule. As a result, other non-state 
parties were finally allowed to contest in the 1992 general elections. However, despite 
the ability to run in these now ‘open’ elections, oppositions parties were only able to 
come to power ten years later in the 2002 elections when a coalition of political par-
ties and civil society groups came together to form the National rainbow Coalition 
(NArC) and won these national elections.
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elections etc., none of these has been part of the reality of the youth 
interviewed here. 
Their life experiences also highlight the personal conditions of 
economic uncertainty which have worsened over the last few decades; 
a situation where basic amenities are no longer affordable and where 
life is ‘not okay’. They say that these are realities force young people to 
engage in income generating practices, which make them even more 
vulnerable to repression from state forces. In mapping out the trajec-
tory of this increasing hardship, Mary picks up on the particular mo-
ments when economic liberalization took on greater ascendance in 
Kenya, and this is in the mid to late 1980s during the Moi era. Her life 
bears witness to its harsh material power in the present. registering 
these particular temporal moments, Mary says that:
The little I get I can’t even provide for my daily needs. Life has not been 
so fair. During the Moi regime, there was corruption and a few jobs 
here and there. But things are worse now; houses that we used to rent 
for 1,500 shillings inclusive of electricity and water now go for 2,500 
shillings exclusive of water and electricity. Essential commodities like 
unga flour also have prices that are too high. When you go to school 
it is said that there is free education yet if you take the child to school 
there are things like books and tuition [after school curriculum stud-
ies] fees that you will be asked to pay. This makes education expensive 
even if it is meant to be free (Mary, interview october 1, 2014). 
Mary and her peers are youth that live in, extending Benjamin’s ex-
pression, the ‘garbage heaps’ of empire; the parts of Nairobi which are 
blatant signifiers of the myths of linear developmentalist ideals and 
in fact are their very ruins. These sites also dispute very manifestly 
the supposed prosperities that are said to emerge from a neoliberal 
political economy for they are neighbourhoods, which often have no 
water, sanitation or basic services. This dearth in fundamental provi-
sions is also coupled with countless state violences, such as the nor-
malization of shoot to kill policies2 and which necessitate young life to 
be lived ‘beyond normal life’. Consequently, whatever democracy they 
may have heard about, it is not here; the practices of the state in these 
neighbourhoods have not differed significantly from previous non-
democratic regimes and are often much worse. Instead, as Achieng 
2 While extra judicial killings by the police are normalized in the country and this is 
seen in the explicit ‘shoot to kill’ policy that police officers have been given at various 
moments in our history (for one example see Kagwanja, 2005: 107), very few human 
rights reports have been able to document the frequency and the full extent of these 
killings which occur in an ongoing manner.
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documents, it is present only for those who have ‘specific resources’ 
who use them ‘specifically for specific people’ and only ‘the specific 
people will always benefit, like the rich and not the poor’ (Achieng, 
interview August 30, 2014). 
Notwithstanding the absence of the rule of law in their lives, both 
individually and collectively these youth enact political practices, 
fragmented or sustained, in their day-to-day activities. These occur 
predominantly in those activities for basic economic survival, and 
which many refer to as their ‘business’ or ‘savings group.’ In these 
actions, while they assert and work for their rights, they do not ex-
plicitly reference democracy and continue in their own movements 
forward which outsiders could infer as the site of actual democratic 
practice (the bids to come together in groups, the privileging of lo-
cal voices, the dialectic debating about alternative politics, consensus 
processes, amongst others). This reach for alternatives notwithstand-
ing, they do not shy away from the normative democratic politics in 
their environment when it works for them. As one interviewee stated 
‘the only task we can do is voting them out’ (Achieng, interview Au-
gust 30, 2014). Therefore, through participating in elections and in 
civil society programmatic activities they engage in these recognized 
political spaces. However, these ‘proper channels’ are often resistant 
to the ways in which young people want to organize, and create ob-
fuscations of additional bureaucracy, ‘technocratic anti-politics’ of 
a similar vain to those practised on shack dwellers in South Africa 
(Pithouse, 2006: 30), which can demoralize and prevent further youth 
engagement. Highlighting this oguna, referring to his elected lead-
ers, stated that:
When some are elected, they think they are superior. If you tell them 
what the youths are facing they speak bad. They are not working for 
the youths. I mobilized youths to go to Kariokor to sermon the youth 
leaders and we were told to use the proper channel. This step was not 
successful and so we wait for the next election (oguna, interview Sep-
tember 1, 2014).
For the most part however, both individually and collectively, these 
young people in Kenya indicate, in both thought and praxis, that the 
political change they envision and want to enact is one that can only 
happen when basic socio-economic rights are established; when life 
stops being ‘hard’ or has signs of improvement. In these uncertain 
conditions that are seen to impact even intimate dreams for the future 
(‘I want to have a ranch and a family’ and ‘my dreams for the future 
are to have a successful business and a happy family’ etc.) they engage 
in political work which is entwined with economic survival. 
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There are definitely many moments of being ‘idle’ of just ‘chew-
ing miraa’ and of ‘talking without actions’; of dreaming of owning a 
storied house but not ‘saving’ to get there and of lethargic reactions 
to any impetus due to rights and needs for support that have been 
spurned. Nonetheless, however long these moments endure, and this 
is impacted by factors such as class, gender, education and individual 
motivation, what is evident is that most youth are involved in work 
that can secure them from ‘routine day to day contingencies’ (Pod-
der, 2015: 41; Honwana, 2012). What’s more I argue, informed by the 
above narratives, that these survival engagements imagine and build 
towards a more substantive situational politics; one that would also 
be free of the killings that cause Mary to say: ‘the youths are dying, 
they get killed and soon we will not have that age group’. In contrast to 
this current ‘democratic moment’ where I would argue that the most 
coordinated killing of young males since the Mau Mau3 period has 
been witnessed (recall the case of the Mungiki youth and Somali and 
Muslim men discussed earlier), the political practices they want to 
put in place would end these violences. It would also be a moment 
where the indignities of lack of employment would be curtailed, and 
there would be the provision of really free education, affordable ba-
sic commodities and rent, access to loans and participatory decision 
making. This would happen within and without the institutionalized 
political structures—in a coming together of temporal and formal mo-
dalities that would be used to work towards these goals. Essentially, 
what they want and work for while is ‘not practiced here’ is bigger, 
and so it engenders a contemporary situation where, paraphrasing 
one interviewee, ‘the only problem with youth is that they want big 
things’ (otieno, interview September 15, 2014), ‘things’ that are much 
bigger than democracy.
sAlvADor DA BAhIA, BrAzIl: the ‘cApItAl of hAppINess’
Like the relationship between Nairobi and Kenya, the history of Brazil 
is also deeply entwined with the foundation of its first capital Salva-
dor da Bahia (Nobre, 2002: 110; Collins, 2013). This initial Brazilian 
metropolis was established in 1549 and the architectural legacies that 
resulted from its life as the foremost Portuguese South Atlantic com-
mercial centre persist, and principally in the historical centre Pelour-
inho, now a UNESCo heritage site. These Iberian baroque ruins, co-
lonial infrastructure, attest to the historical trajectories of the country 
3 The Mau Mau was also known as the Kenya Land and Freedom Army and was the 
foremost military wing of the independence movement in Kenya. The Mau Mau were 
most active from the late 1940s until the late 1950s.
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and which include the murder and displacement of millions of indig-
enous people, settler colonialism, slavery and deeply structured racial 
inequalities. The dual developments of this urban, demonstrated by 
the cidade alta (high city) and cidade baixa (low city), evidence the 
classed and racial materialities that emerged from all of these mo-
ments. Furthermore, I would argue that they confer another subter-
ranean quality to the city that emerges from the hauntings of these 
combined moments, and with particular regard to the underground 
infrastructures and memories of enslavement that uphold the urban 
architecture.
referring to Salvador, although attending to broader trends, Col-
lins (2008) asserts that ‘given the extent to which today’s institutions, 
ethics, modes of interpretation, racial ideologies, and political eco-
nomic structures emerged in relation to a colonial world, much of 
the physical and metaphorical landscape upon which we all tread is 
an imperial effect’ (Collins, 2008: 283). The focus on Salvador there-
fore, while central to this paper, is also a medium through which to 
map out the history of Brazil that develops from the combined forces 
that constitute these imperial stamps, and which, akin to Nairobi, still 
have significant material power in the city today.
Not too long after Amerigo Vespucii landed in Bahia in 1501 
and gave it its name, the slave trade to this part of the world was es-
tablished. Via the British ships that carried enslaved Africans to the 
Americas these ‘unfortunate arrivals’ traversed the Atlantic and were 
brought to the North Eastern city that would later be known as Sal-
vador. They came as the cargo and motor of these vessels and built an 
urban space, in sharp contrast to its name and despite the number 
of churches in its vicinity, which was never their saviour. It is their 
industry, blood and bondage, and that of their descendants, that cre-
ated this colonial urban, the ‘brown mother of Brazil’, which has since 
contributed to every aspect of Brazil as we know it today (Paixao, 
2004; Collins, 2013). 
Salvador was the largest slave entry port in the Americas and it 
is principally through this harbour that Brazil received the largest 
number of enslaved Africans during the slave trade (Skidmore, 1990: 
7; Sansone, 1998: 3; Graden, 2006: xix). Conservative estimates put 
the number who came to Bahia, between 1520-1850, at 4.4 million 
(Graden, 2006: 1). These Africans were forced to labour in the cof-
fee, tobacco, sugar and cocoa plantations that made this region so 
important to Portugal.4 From the late XVIII century, as the country 
4 In the XVI and XVII centuries, Bahia became one of the world’s great sugar cen-
tres due to the extensive plantation system which relied on slavery (Pierson, 1967: 7).
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grew in size and other states began to establish themselves agricul-
turally, there was an internal slave trade that saw many enslaved Af-
ricans moved from the North East to the South when ‘the foreign 
slave trade was closed and the growth of the coffee producing regions 
of southern Brazil’ made imperative the procurement of additional 
forced labour (Degler, 1971: 38-39). It was in this same period that 
the capital was transferred further south to rio (Collins, 2013: 167; 
Vasconcelos, 2006).
Notwithstanding the primacy of slavery in this region, this city 
of Salvador or São Salvador da Bahia de Todos os Santos5  as it was 
initially christened was never meant to be a black city. To the great 
dismay of Dom Joao6 of Portugal and many of his subjects, efforts 
to disperse the black population proved futile since the capital city 
of this new Portugal had considerable ‘preponderance of the negro’ 
(Pierson, 1967: 29). In fact after abolition, by virtue of the fervent 
national bids to undo the cruel history (ies) which had facilitated the 
presence of too many negros, it was said that blacks in Brazil would 
have had more luck entering ‘the kingdom of heaven’ than Brazil 
(Skidmore, 1974: 194). Associated with this, abolition, while had 
happened later than anywhere in the world, created indignant fer-
vour about the possible ‘radicalization of the abolitionist movement’, 
and this fear had grave consequences for the Afro-Brazilian popu-
lation (Paixao, 2004). A direct result of this, and as Paixao (2004) 
documents, is that ‘drums, spiritism, faith healing and the African-
Brazilian martial art called Capoeira were considered a crime’, and 
‘criminal liability was lowered to 9 years of age’ (Paixao, 2004: 746; 
and see also reis, 2005).
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that with the dawning of the 
new republic in 1889, one year after emancipation, race became 
more keenly discussed in Brazil. The burgeoning social and political 
thought between 1888-1914 was filled with preoccupations (as well as 
disavowals of this preoccupation) with the race question (Skidmore, 
1974: 118). During this time, in a bid to refashion itself from an ex-
slavocracy into a country with the economic, political, social and cul-
tural requisites of the ‘modern’ world, Brazil debated its future avidly. 
The emerging intelligentsia wondered, agitated, whether ‘modern pro-
5 In English, it means ‘Holy Saviour of All Saints Bay’. It was so named after Amer-
igo Vespucii the Italian explorer who landed there on All Saints Day, November 1st 
1501. Amerigo Vespucii also gave his name to the Americas, which initially only re-
ferred to Latin America. 
6 Dom Joao was the king of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Al-
garves from 1777 to 1825.
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gress was meant only for white men in temperate zones’ such as the 
US and France (Skidmore, 1974: IX). And the key motivating question 
that would fuel these debates for the next few years was: how can we 
prepare for a future that looks likes Europe? 
one of the first solutions employed to attend to this national 
question was to attempt to look like Europe phenotypically (Skid-
more, 1990: 124; Paixao, 2004). This was conducted through eugenic 
practices that were entrenched both in the constitution and immigra-
tion laws, as well as a Lombrosian criminology which linked phe-
notype to criminality—working to barbarize African descendants in 
Brazil and beyond7 (Nascimento, 2007; Vargas, 2008). The Freyrian8 
pastoral scene of a racial democracy that was to become the ‘basis 
for Brazil’s self-portrait’ and ‘modern identity’ from the 1930s on-
wards was very far from being realized (Skidmore, 1976, Hanchard, 
1998:54; Paixao, 2004).
For Salvador, this meant that every notable growth period of the 
city reinforced a ‘padrão periférica’. This is an extension of the city by 
a fortification and augmentation of economic spatial divides where, as 
if often the case, each territory can assume different colours (Soares, 
2009). An example of this is the Pelourinho district, which began as an 
imperial centre of whiteness in 1549, and at the end of the XIX cen-
tury was incrementally being occupied by ‘workers’ and ‘immigrants’. 
By 1940, engulfed in a period of decline, it was officially declared a 
‘red-light zone’ (Collins, 2013: 167), and, at once, anthropologically, as 
the Black rome (Sansone, 2000: 5). 
on the national front, the post-world war period was marked 
by extended moments of both elected governments (1946-1964), 
7 In 1921, bolstered by claims that there was a racial democracy in Brazil, members 
of the Brazilian-America Colonization Syndicate, all of whom were black American, 
had a unique mission to set up a community in the ‘racial democracy’ so extolled by 
Freyre and his advocates. They planned this in order to escape the Jim Crow rule 
of law in Louisiana. Hindered at the outset, the dreams of a terrestrial paradise for 
these African descendants would never be realized. The reason, although they would 
not know it until much later, was that their skin colour was adjudged to be ‘regres-
sive’ in the process of miscegenation, and that this posed a threat to Brazil’s, sup-
posed, racial democracy (Gomes, 2003). 
8 Gilberto Freyre was one of Brazil’s defining social theorists in the early twenti-
eth century. In the 1930s, he wrote a seminal sociological survey on Brazilian race 
relations titled the Master and the Slave (1933). In this book, he described these race 
relations as harmonious and asserted that this was evidenced by the large mulatto 
population. This ‘Freyrian’ view of race relations has endured for a long time as it has 
been propagated by the state both locally and internationally, and has thus proved 
an indefatigable obstacle to the black organisations which seek to bring to light the 
prevalence of anti-black racism in Brazil.  
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and a military dictatorship (1964 to 1985). This earlier period 
was also shaped topographically by an increase in urbanization 
due to the development of both the oil and steel industry in Sal-
vador. The lack of sufficient and adequate housing for this surge 
of new workers led to increasing ‘densification’ of already estab-
lished favela areas; integrating them firmly into urban life and 
giving rise to the contours of the city as we know it today (Soares, 
2009: 87).
Despite the socio-political restrictions that came with the dic-
tatorship, from about the late 1960s a ‘revolution of rising expec-
tations’ was on the horizon. In Salvador, much of this took the 
form of an explicitly black expression of discontent, and was also 
inspired by the anti-racist and anti-colonial struggles all over Af-
rica and the black Diaspora. As a result, black power ideologies 
and goods, strategies and semiotics from transnational African 
networks, became integral as signifiers of an Africa and blackness 
that was, since the 1970s, relentlessly being imagined in the city, 
and in a process that is often referred to as the ‘re-Africanization’ 
of Bahia (Sansone, 1999, Crook, 2009; Covin, 1996; Hanchard, 
1998). While this re-africanization was incrementally being ter-
ritorialized in the city as whole, both Pelourinho and Liberdade 
were, and still are, neighbourhoods whose names became key me-
tonyms for this vibrant and powerful ‘blackitude’.  
Silva de Almeida (2002) asserts that it was social movements 
like these in the 1980s which organized and triggered ‘new conflicts’ 
that helped push out the military dictatorship, as well as claim 
new rights that ‘left their mark on the 1988 constitution (Silva de 
Almeida. 2002: 10). The power of these movements, however, was 
diminished significantly by Brazil’s taking up of orthodox neoliberal 
projects; a process that also occurred in tandem with, and was also 
inhered by, a hegemonic idea of democracy. Therefore, this decade 
that was lived under the hope of social movements was closed with 
the ascension of a neoliberal mission introduced under the dem-
ocratically elected government that succeeded the dictatorship in 
1985 (Silva de Almeida, 2002; Petras and Veltemeyer et al., 2003; 
Saad Filho, 2010).
Attending to this Saad Filho (2010) asserts that ‘at the political 
level, democracy has become established as the political form of neo-
liberalism in Brazil.’ rather, the neoliberal transition and the demo-
cratic transition are ‘mutually reinforcing and, eventually, mutually 
constituting’ (Saad Filho, 2010: 24). For the author this symbiotic 
relationship between democracy and neoliberalism happened in the 
following three ways:
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First, the neoliberal economic transition was achieved through, and 
validated by, democratic means. Second, neoliberal policies support 
the democratic regime because they fragment the workers through 
higher unemployment, faster labour turnover, the repression of trade 
union activities, and the rise of economic insecurity. Under neoliber-
alism, the repression of working class activities becomes primarily 
‘economic’ rather than ‘political,’ as was the case under the dictator-
ship. Third, democracy is the best political regime for neoliberalism 
because it guarantees the stability and predictability of the ‘rules of 
the game,’ making it more easily managed by the moneyed interests 
(Saad Filho, 2010: 24).
As they work together the conjunction of these two forces ultimately 
engendered the ‘amplification of social inequalities that had histori-
cally accumulated’ in the country, and in Latin America as a whole 
(Silva de Almeida, 2002: 11).
 In the 1980s, these inequalities were evident in the increased 
precarity in the periferias of Salvador, and were catalyzed, in part, 
by the decline in manufacturing jobs, as well as the dearth of Mu-
nicipality expenditure in these mostly poor and black areas; a situ-
ation also aggravated by the distance to the town centre as well as 
a poor public transport system (Sansone, 1999; Soares, 2009). Fur-
thermore, Soares (2009) documents that it was in the 1980s and 
1990s, the emergent neoliberal period, that poverty grew immensely 
in the periferia and the ‘seas of poverty’ and ‘islands of wealth’ that 
characterize the city were consolidated (Soares, 2009: 89, 94). More 
specific to the Pelourinho district a neoliberal heritage movement, 
a direct result of the ‘UNESCo’S acceptance of the neighbourhood 
onto its World Heritage List,’ sanctioned the displacement of many 
of its residents. While historical re-instantiations of this segrega-
tion continued, Salvador’s spatial apartheid was now further re-
entrenched under a newer neoliberal front; the guise of heritage 
(Collins, 2013: 168).
 For young people in Brazil, the majority of who are facing the 
dire social and economic insecurity that is consistently being ossi-
fied in their environment, their experiences of neoliberal democracy 
are shaped by its ominous manifestations on an intimate and com-
munity level. This uncertainty brought about by the present moment 
inevitably impacts their participation in normative political life, and 
with marked regional disparities (Silva, 2009: 12; Pimenta, 2014). 
In regards to the North East, it is an area with one of the highest 
levels of poverty, unemployment and illiteracy in the whole country 
(Paixao, 2004; Soares, 2009). This structural inequality is also deeply 
inflected by a racism that persists in this city, and whose manifesta-
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tions consistently call into question its status as the capital of ‘hap-
piness’ and ‘saints’.
The youth who we profile here come from these experiences. As 
mentioned earlier, most of them were born during the 1980s, which 
was a seminal period for some of the stronger and more radical so-
cial movement actions by organizations, such as the Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST) / The Landless Workers Movement; 
the explicitly black organizing nationally and locally through organi-
zations such as the Movimento Negro Unificado (MNU) / United Ne-
gro Movement, and Ile Aiye. Furthermore, they grew and became 
more socially and politically aware in these times of the neoliberal 
project that gained traction even in Lula’s, ostensive, ‘Third Way’ (Pe-
tras and Veltemeyer, 2003). As a consequence, much of their day to 
day life is taken up by negotiations of an environment where three 
times more Afro-Brazilians are killed by the police than any other 
racial grouping in Brazil, and where the police kill six people every 
day. race, then, is a ‘matter of life and death’ in Brazil (Smith, 2014), 
and this is a corporality that is very familiar to them. 
Police violence is compounded by economic precarity, lack of 
access to basic healthcare and good education, as well as the penal-
ization of many forms of urban protest. The coverage of the recent 
passe livre and anti-World Cup protests and the shock at the obvi-
ously violent responses from the State, have shown to the world 
what many black and poor communities have been facing in ur-
ban spaces for a long time. Moreover, the combined structural ag-
gressions further demonstrate how ‘disjunctive democracy’ installs 
some rights while violating others; bringing about a situation of 
both celebrated democracy and unrelenting political violence (Cal-
deira and Holston, 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006). Demon-
strating this paradox is the simultaneous increase in the incidence 
of homicides for Afro-Brazilians alongside more affirmative action 
and public discussions about structural racism. Stressing these 
contradictions, Vargas (2008) also argues that this is a time when 
there has never been:
[...] so many Black nongovernmental organizations focusing on health, 
violence, media, culture and electoral politics. Never has so much Black 
music and so many dance groups engaging with, openly criticizing and 
proposing alternatives to endemic Brazilian racism [...] olodum and 
Ile- Aiye in Salvador, Cidade Negra and Afroreggae in rio being only 
the very tip of a vital movement that does not shy away from the na-
tional public sphere while engaged in local grassroots antiracist ef-
forts. Never has Brazil had such vigorous debate on affirmative action, 
reparations, and historical forms of racialized discrimination. Never 
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has Brazil had so many self-defined Afro-Brazilian elected representa-
tives at the local, state, and national levels. Never has Brazil had so 
many weekly magazines run by and targeted to Blacks. And, it seems, 
never, sadly, has Brazil had such levels of police brutality, death, and 
other forms of violence perpetrated against Blacks, especially in large 
cities such as São Paulo, rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, and 
recife (Vargas, 2008: 119).
It is to the narratives of young people immersed in these moments of 
both political democracy and violence that we now turn.  
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‘I AM Not DreAMINg  
ABout DeMocrAcY’
WHILE MULTIPLE INForMAL individual and group conversations 
were conducted as part of this research project in Brazil, only eleven 
were conducted in the semi-structured interview format that was inte-
gral to this process. These interviews were conducted by my research 
assistant; a 27 year old photographer, ‘militante’ and sociology student 
at the Federal University of Bahia.
The same thirteen questions used in Kenya also applied in Sal-
vador, although with some contextual allowances. Below I draw ex-
tensively from five interviews, from three women and two men, all of 
which I translated myself. The other youth experiences not included 
here were, nevertheless, instrumental in guiding some of the key as-
sumptions of this paper, and were also useful to the data analysis pro-
cess. It is important to note that these youth came from diverse barrios 
populares in Salvador, a city with roughly the same population as Nai-
robi; Caixa da Água, Brotas, Laura de Freitas, Pirajá and Beiru. And 
in this collection of lived moments, they offer a survey of what life is 
like for young people in this city.  
cArolINe 
My name is Caroline. I have a degree in education from the Federal 
University of Bahia. I am also an evangelical. I trained to be a teacher 
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but I’m not working. Currently I am sustained by my parents. When 
I want a little extra money, I do some small work here and there for 
some women and this gives me some money for a week or so. I have 
lived in Pirajá for the last twenty-four years.
Look, I realize that being young in Piraja is not much different 
than being young and black in Brazil, especially in the periferia [per-
iferal and popular neighbourhoods]. And many young people are not 
worried about the future, but I’m not blaming them for that under-
stand? I know it is something bigger than them that we need to blame, 
something that transcends the truth. And many are working and not 
working, or working in the informal market in low wage jobs. And 
many do not study. They have little chances in their life and many 
are not sure how to grasp it as they should. And what I see for young 
people in Pirajá is that to study is the second or last option. What they 
do [...] in fact, they want to earn life in a fast way. They want work and 
they want money. And sometimes they work and study and then work 
in the end does not work out. They do not have a family to support 
them like I do right now, and who help me as I continue my studies for 
a master’s degree. The other young people do not have this opportu-
nity and they have to work, putting studying aside [...] neglecting it in 
a way that is not neglect. It really is all difficult to reconcile.
There have been some changes over the years, and I can talk in re-
gards to education... I’ll talk regarding studies. A while ago, say even 5 
years ago, we did not know a young university graduate on our street. 
Then recently a girl I used to eat with managed to get into university, 
and then I also went to college. Also the quota system for blacks has 
enabled many young people to enter university. I think it also raises 
the self-esteem we have. Now some are thinking: ‘there I can get into 
college,’ and are even thinking ‘I can get into UFBA [Federal Univer-
sity of Bahia], I can enter UNEB [University of the State of Bahia] 
and any federal and state university.’ I see now that some are already 
claiming this space. But in relation to studies we are still a minority. 
And it is still only a very a small portion that are leaving high school 
who are thinking about this. But those who left maybe 2 or 3 years ago 
are no longer interested in education. It is just work they are thinking 
about [...] and then some young women get pregnant early and so they 
have to leave their studies because they have a family.
Democracy is a type of governing that is open to all—at least it 
is theoretically like this. But for us in the black community that real-
ity has not been extended. We live in a democracy, but an imaginary 
democracy; illusory democracy. We black youths do not have access 
to our basic rights, unlike a young middle-class white person who 
has access to the best schools, they have all the necessary financial 
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conditions for life and have so much knowledge of the world; they 
who live their whole life in a private school, travelling [...] Anyway, it 
is quite different from our reality as black youths from the periphery. 
But it is even more complicated for us to access a college and try to 
adjust into other spaces where there are young people who have had 
everything in life. 
Then, about neoliberalism... neoliberalism is minimal state in-
tervention in the economy, and this is only minimal intervention to 
strengthen large companies and industries and big business. And on 
the other hand, it is we the people that are going to be hurt by this 
whole market opening for private companies.
For the future, I dream that we always take education as an um-
brella; that all black youths from the periphery have access to qual-
ity education not only in college, but in their basic education. Then 
there are the politics of quotas that opens university up to these black 
youths. This has to be accompanied by a reform in basic education. 
We need a better basic education and this is more important than the 
university. our community needs basic needs to improve significantly, 
much more than access to university.
I think that’s it. Also you have to have self-esteem. The self-esteem 
of black youth has been shaken constantly by a number of factors. 
I think that this is a problem which affects the psychology of black 
youth who think that they are not capable of anything; who find them-
selves unable to get a good job and think they will not get through 
college. And this is a very complicated issue that has been going on for 
a while [...] the self-esteem of the young person has been bombarded 
since childhood. So it is complicated to deconstruct this, but it is pos-
sible, highly possible through education.
sAvIA
My name is Savia and I am 19 years old. What more? I don’t know, 
like, I’m black, a student of social sciences in the first half of my de-
gree at UNEB, and I am now going into the second half of the year. I 
went to a private secondary school on a scholarship. I live in Lauro de 
Freitas in Intinga. Intinga is a neighbourhood of Lauro. I have lived 
there for nine years. Life here is pretty similar to the life of black youth 
in the entire periphery of Bahia; young boys are quite marginalized 
and there is a real issue of drug trafficking. That is quite clear.
So I’m a bit of an exception there where I live. All the young peo-
ple I know are studying in public school, or those who do not study in 
public schools are scholarship recipients in private schools, or their 
parents end up paying for private school. Some young people I know 
are not in the city because of problems with the police. And so they 
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spend time outside and then come back. Sometime it is also problems 
with the police or problems with the traffickers themselves. There was 
a recent change in my neighbourhood that I think was more ideologi-
cal than practical, and this was the installation of the UPP [Unidade de 
Policia Pacificadora / Police Pacification Unit] there in Intinga. There 
was that thought that ‘the installation of the UPP in Intinga has come 
and now things will change.’ As if the violence would diminish due to 
the UPP! It does not make that much difference whether the UPP is 
civilian or military, I don’t like it. And I hear and understand the sug-
gestions about the importance of people watching over you more. All 
the same, there has not been any practical change in the reduction 
of violence or drug trafficking in the community. I don’t think it is so 
positive installing the UPP there. It just appears to be a continuation 
of the criminalization of the black community, and we can’t stop the 
shootings that come with this… 
I’ve heard talk about democracy, I mean what common sense says 
about democracy. Durkheim also talked about democracy. I know that 
common sense thinks that democracy is people power, but what does 
that mean in practice? The theory is cool, but the practice is not so 
interesting because the representatives that people have do not repre-
sent the people or their interests, and instead represent the minority. 
Neoliberalism? I just know basic stuff. you could say that I’m half 
illiterate politically, and that’s because I’m still self-subjected to a logic 
that says everything which is connected to politics is bad and I should 
try and change it—that’s why I am not interested in knowing anything 
about it. University is also not saying anything interesting. 
Individually I dream about having the basics, and sometimes I 
think that it appears to be a privilege just to want the minimum, the 
basics right? For example, owning a home, having financial stability 
[...] I do not want to be rich but I do want to have what is basic, and 
travel the world with my job. I plan to be an anthropologist. Individu-
ally [...] I’m not dreaming about democracy, but it is kind of utopian 
thinking about equality, an egalitarian world for everyone [...] for eve-
ry gender, race, ethnicity [...] I dream of what at the end of the day? 
Anarchism is interesting.
For young people in Brazil and Kenya [...] everyone wants one 
recommendation all the time, huh? okay, study your ass off to get out 
of the marginalized condition that we are in. I know that it makes us 
tired having to overcome everything; you have to overcome the scrap-
ping of the public university, public health etc., but this is the way 
that you overcome to achieve. And also it is important to join forces 
to fight this system that inserts us in this context of marginalization. 
As an individual, I’m trying to fight my way out of the marginalized 
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condition that I am in, and I am doing this through what everyone put 
in my head—that I had to study to get into the university. Collectively, 
I do not know what I do. I have not done anything yet although there 
are some projects that I am thinking about in my head that are in the 
stage of ‘analysis’.
clAuDIo 
I’m from Jacobina, and currently live in Salvador. I have lived here 
for two years. For money [...] I have no fixed income and I am sus-
tained by my mother. I lived in Jacobina until I was in the transition 
from ages 17 to 18, and then I came to Salvador. The life of a youth 
in Jacobina is totally different than the life of a youth in Salvador. So 
Jacobina for me, in the world view that I have, has not advanced. In 
Jacobina there exists a multinational called yamana Gold, and it is 
because of this company that Jacobina is known as the City of Gold. 
So until today, since the arrival of Bandeirantes [Fortune Hunters], be-
cause the city was built by these pioneers we explore gold in Jacobina. 
And so there is a multinational which is from Canada named yamana 
Gold, and the city is entirely dependent on the company. The trade 
depends on yamana Gold. And of all the gold that workers remove 
for yamana Gold not even 1% or 0.01% stays here, it is all exported to 
Canada. The company has tax-free status, and even controls the local 
economy. There is still plenty of gold in Jacobina and it is estimated 
that there is still about 30-40 years before it is depleted. And Jacobina 
is totally hostage to it, and people like [...] people don’t have the politi-
cal sense to know the effects of this mining by yamana Gold.
I’ve heard so much about democracy. For me the society that I live 
in now, when I was 15 or 16, I thought it was quite a democratic soci-
ety, a society of freedom of rights; a beautiful society. So when I came 
to Salvador in between my 17 and 18th year I had a ‘thump’ and reality 
struck. The first thump I had was because I went into a pre-university 
course and I found myself living with different people, people of many 
identities and all with different economic power. So that was my first 
thump. And also the studies I had in the pre-university courses were 
also a thump. Many things I learned in these courses I did not learn 
in school, and had never heard talked about. So that’s my process [...] 
it was a very ‘punk’ process, but it was still a process of understand-
ing political structures. I now know how the dynamics of capital in 
society work. I understand what it is to be black. I understand the 
process of struggle and exploitation that black people have suffered 
and suffer to this day. I understand all these issues, and have more on 
the inside, and now I think I am totally different and I think different 
than I thought three years ago.
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What do I think about neoliberalism? It just really does not 
make sense to stop here to explain what economic liberalism is as it 
is a historical process. But for me, briefly, neoliberalism is a bour-
geois practice of capitalist logic that is part of the process of making 
markets in society; its use value, exchange value and even the whole 
process of social welfare policies and pacification policies such as 
the UPP. And then we return to that question of youth… regarding 
the UPP’s; why are the youth not aware of what the UPPs are? Why 
are UPPs installed in the poor neighbourhoods where most of the 
population is black, poor and favelada? And this population does 
not have the critical consciousness to know that black people have 
suffered and suffer to this day. And the youth have no idea either. 
Why not equip the youth so they can get stronger? The process of 
neoliberalism didn’t end all of this, the process of neoliberalism is 
exactly this; you become a hostage to this practice even if you have 
no idea what those practices are. Like the paternalistic welfare prac-
tices that we see an intensification of by some parties that we elect 
to power; all those practices that do not help the people at all, espe-
cially black people.
As an individual, I dream of a society where people can be equal, 
a society where people can have the same material conditions. So, col-
lectively I dream of the same; this is an emancipation of the working 
class, the emancipation of the black revolution and that black people 
understand their history and how it has functioned. I also dream that 
the youth from the periphery lift themselves up from what has been 
imposed on them.
A strategy for us all is to keep on fighting and not to give up be-
cause our only emancipation is resistance. only resistance will show 
that we are strong, it shows that we can lift ourselves and we can have 
the black revolution, and we can show that we are blacks because we 
understand our historical process of being black is resistance; resist-
ance and fighting for social emancipation.
fABIANA
My name is Fabiana Lima and I live in Arraial do Retiro, I’m currently 
enrolled in a Nursing program at Mauricio de Nassau which is a pri-
vate institution. I harbour the hope of going to a public institution one 
day. I am 18 years old. At the moment, to gain a little money, I recite 
poetry both individually and in a group.
Now, as a group, we recite poetry in buses. We also have small 
poetry booklets that we give out, but we also sometimes just recite 
poetry. our group is called ‘The Poet resistance’ and we meet eve-
ry week. We sometimes work together in pairs, and we get money 
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through ‘passing the hat’ on the bus. We do this not only with the 
intention of just doing poetry, but so as to get people to reflect on race 
and social issues in Brazil.
I live in Arraial do retiro. At the moment the neighbourhood 
has been very quiet, but it was never this way. The issue of drug 
trafficking has always been a big issue in this area. All the same, I 
socialize with neighbours and with residents, and sometimes not 
when I don’t feel like it. Why is this so? I feel like I belong to another 
world. I try to be with them, I try to bring them to my side but this 
is not always seen as a good thing. In the end, I have become alone 
in my own neighbourhood. I enter and leave, talk to people but do 
not walk with anyone.
I have seen a person go to their child and say about me: ‘oh, this 
one she studies hard she is always busy.’ They would only see me when 
I was selling popsicles on the bus and on the beach. I started at 13 
years old, and they were always very happy with me because my cous-
in had another more violent path and he followed it even if we had 
started selling popsicles together. But then again I do not know… my 
cousin had other ways and he could not stand the harsh reality of life 
and went to the world of crime. So, they always made this compari-
son and they say: ‘why, you did not follow the same life as your cousin 
even if you lived in the same house. This is very good’. 
What I notice is that there is no chance at all in that community. 
I have lived there for the last 18 years and all the projects that have 
tried to come out of there did not survive. In addition, I see no other 
cultural moments in the community except the times when people 
come together over the weekend and sit at the bar to drink and 
dance. Aside from that, I see no other chances of coming together. 
This october, because of the forthcoming elections, two doctors, 
one general practitioner and a dentist are going to come to our com-
munity. But I’m sure it is only this month because of the elections. 
Throughout the year this does not happen, the government does not 
send anyone.
What I understand about democracy is that all people should 
have the same opportunity to have the same rights and the same du-
ties. What I think of democracy in Brazil is that it does not happen 
here. This is due to the historical and indisputable fact of social in-
equalities. I do not believe in democracy in Brazil. 
I do not see that neoliberalism has improved or worsened my 
community. I do not see that neoliberalism brings a space for cul-
ture. I do not see that neoliberalism brings a praça where these peo-
ple can go with their kids. I do not see that this neoliberalism is good 
for the youth. 
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My life is [...] I as a person, as an individual, I always seek 
knowledge and this has brought a huge improvement to my life. And 
also as an individual I always seek to bring people to the reality that 
knowledge always builds up the person. Not only financially, but it is 
something that is very good. And as an individual also I’ve thought 
about starting community projects here like poetry recitals, but the 
fact of wanting to get into college, financial issues and also because 
I am alone I have not been able to establish these poetry recitals. 
Today I am rethinking this idea because I am with a group and so 
it may be easier. But I think as an individual I still need to bring an 
improvement to the community… I think of bringing both pleasure 
and reflection for the community. And I think this can best come out 
of a group because it is a coming together of a very strong militancy. 
It is not nothing to get into a bus and say that racism exists right? 
Not an easy thing, there is danger in this. As well, talking about the 
government that robs us and what we can envision anew [...] it is not 
an easy thing.
As an individual, I dream of a financially better condition in my 
life and in the lives of my grandmother, my mother and my sister. And 
that I can get a medical degree in endocrinology and be a general sur-
geon. I would then be a great reference for the community and be seen 
as a black woman who is a winner. Collectively I want, and I do not 
know if I’ll be alive to see it, but that the black community is strength-
ened and that there will really be a racial democracy in Brazil. And 
that democracy will exist insofar as there are all rights and equal du-
ties for everyone. And that no more young black victims die of a stray 
bullet, or through the genocide that is happening of young black men 
through police violence. I also hope today that no more young people 
die, and if death comes it will come as part of a natural ageing process. 
I think that is our wish collectively, to win over these bad vibes that 
are happening here. 
I would say that we should fight and we cannot give up on our 
dreams because if you believe in yourself, anything is possible. And 
some setbacks will happen, some smaller and others larger, but do not 
give up on anything you dream. And look for strength where it is not, 
and we will try to make life better in every way, not only financially, 
but with all our friends friend’s and society. And go on fighting to try 
to improve the lives of everyone, not just for yourself but for everyone. 
That is what I leave as a message.
heNrIque
So my name is Henrique, I’m a student of history here at UFBA. I am 
25 years old and a militant of the black movement as well! I am in no 
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black movement organization, but I do this work through my own 
actions as I am not institutionalized or organized in any space but ad-
vocate for the cause of being black, and I understand the importance 
of this. I am also a militant of the PCB [Partido Comunista Brasileiro / 
Brazilian Communist Party] and the UJC [União da Juventude Comu-
nista/ Communist youth Union]. I live in Beiru.
Beiru was a farm that was given as inheritance to the owner who 
was an enslaved person that had had a very good relationship with his 
‘master’— that is how he got this land. This farm which was legally 
owned by him then became a quilombo [maroon community] where 
other black people came to hide and try to reconstruct their lives away 
from slavery. The violent politics of the state in this area still continues 
to date. But the crime rate there has gone down. Still the police vio-
lence against the community continues.
As I am a Marxist, I ask: ‘who is democracy for?’ We understand 
that democracy in its meaning is the will of the majority, right? Ex-
cept that in a classed society, democracy for the majority is not pos-
sible right? There are other instruments that exploit the interests of 
the majority and make sure the interests of the minority dominate 
over the majority. So democracy, therefore, today is elective; it boils 
down to you voting twice every four years. Being a ‘political citizen’ 
means that you go and vote, but other mechanisms of direct and 
indirect participation do not exist as it is only the election which 
counts as politics. These mechanisms are super distant from the 
masses and their daily political life. And when the masses recognize 
this and want to participate directly in politics, the state power uses 
police repression and also judicial means and repressive laws against 
them. Democracy, in my opinion, is a scenario when the minority 
society, which is the bourgeoisie that destroys and splits the class-
es—these are the bankers, factory owners, contractors, and media, 
—can ensure the greatest control through violence but also through 
democracy and elections.
Neoliberalism was a policy that started in Brazil in the 1980s 
and 1990s. What happened was that there was a commercialization 
of services and of all kinds of things that you can think off. So from 
health, education, housing, sanitation and even safety, all are meant 
to be privatized. It is also the transfer of the economy from the state; 
the privatization of national companies. Brazil’s neoliberalism was a 
social catastrophe. For youth this also brought about the privatiza-
tion of their public spaces which were then given to private initia-
tives to build hotels, apartment buildings and shopping centres. This 
reduced the spaces where youth can socialize and have sport courts, 
squares, places for theatre and local bands. So, neoliberalism in so-
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ciety reduced youth public space, as it commoditized and privatized 
public land. 
I don’t see that there is a lot of politicization of youth in this com-
munity. I do very little to change this, actually, because we also need 
resources to do this. Maybe a community radio could do a lot to en-
gage the consciousness of youth... even newspapers. But we have no 
means to fight for an ideal society together as youth. Maybe a conver-
sation here and a small circle there when it is possible to discuss a few 
issues. But our target of action is too small, and we have to recognize 
that as well; that our range of action, our means of accessing these 
youth is also very limited. It is not the fault of the youth. And it is also 
difficult to dialogue with people. 
I dream that in the future there will be another society. I dream 
[...] maybe I do not see this process happening but it is important that 
we stick to it and defend an egalitarian society that is more just right? 
Where individuals can participate in political and social life [...] It is 
good to know that no one is against that. I think about another Brazil, 
a Brazilian society where individuals see themselves as equals, and are 
equal. Whether it will be formal through laws or in the constitution it 
does not matter, what matters is that this egalitarianism between in-
dividuals within their differences and convergences will exist. respect 
and tolerance for all sexualities and especially for blacks and women 
who are the most exploited and historically oppressed groups. That is 
what I dream.
‘MY lIfe Is lIKe the lIfe of All YouNg BlAcK people  
IN the perIferIA’
The youth profiled here from Salvador, similar to their Kenyan peers, 
are not ‘dreaming’ about democracy. While narratives about the end 
of the dictatorship and the emergence of a more democratic political 
and social environment have been part of their childhood, they do not 
seem to differentiate their current political moment from those that 
have gone before them. Moreover they do not believe in democracy in 
the form in which it appears in national political spaces—in the setup 
of socio-political relationships it has engendered—because of the ‘in-
disputable fact of social inequalities’ (Fabiana, interview october 8, 
2014). Furthermore, for the most part, for those who are acquainted 
with the term neoliberalism, they do not see it making significant 
changes in their lives; transformations that would indicate rupture in 
their ‘fatal ways of being alive’ (Marriot, 2000: 15). rather, for them, 
it is part of a historical process of marginalization that is now merely 
advanced—an ‘advanced marginality’ (Wacquant, 2008) that coheres, 
especially, in their neighbourhoods and in their generation. 
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Consonant with this Claudio emphasises that ‘it just really does 
not make sense to stop here to explain what economic liberalism is as 
it is a historical process’. He goes on to say that for those who are not 
accustomed to this term it does not mean that their lives are exempt 
from its knotty entanglements since ‘the process of neoliberalism is 
exactly this. you become a hostage to this practice even if you have 
no idea what those practices are. Like the paternalistic welfare prac-
tices that we see an intensification of by some parties that we elect to 
power; all those practices that do not help the people at all, especially 
black people’ (Claudio, interview october 5, 2014).
Efforts to challenge this status quo where the ‘realities of de-
mocracy have not been extended’ are, admittedly, on their part lim-
ited (Caroline, interview october 1, 2014). rather, while their par-
ticipation in elections is guaranteed and upheld ‘twice every four 
years’, Henrique conveys that alternative political expressions that 
are outside of the ballot, and which he would prefer to engage in, 
are received with repression. These state responses can be seen to 
stimulate and occur concurrently with what is often considered 
youth apathy; blatant disinterest in normative political spaces and 
also a delinking from institutions which can be seen to be part of 
the same state forces i.e. education and formal employment. As one 
interviewee in Kenya described it, ‘as a common citizen you just sur-
render because we have no other option’ (Muthuri, interview August 
29, 2014). This indifference, while subject to individual agency, can 
also be due both to feelings of domination and to the lack of mean-
ingful opportunities in many poor urban communities that provokes 
a disregard for official institutions, and prevents the completion of 
accepted life progressions by many young people and in this way 
leading to an interminable ‘waithood’ (Honwana, 2012). This apa-
thy can be further explained in Caroline’s terms when she says that 
youth are ‘neglecting [life] in a way that is not neglect’ (Caroline, 
interview october 1, 2014). 
Highlighting these situations in an article that discusses the ‘dic-
tatorship over the poor’ in Brazil, Wacquant (2003: 200) states that:
For, despite its return to constitutional democracy, Brazil has 
yet to construct a state of laws worthy of the name. Two decades 
of military dictatorship continue to weigh heavily on the function-
ing of public force, as well as on collective mentalities, with the 
result that a broad spectrum of social classes tends to identify the 
defence of human rights with tolerance of bandidagem. So that, be-
sides deep-seated urban marginality, violence in Brazil finds a sec-
ond root in a political culture that remains profoundly marked by 
the scars of authoritarianism.
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It is due to this encrustation of authoritarianism and its novel and 
recurring neoliberal instantiations that these youth from Salvador call 
for a new society, a ‘new Brazil’.
It is important here to mention the recent bids to make university 
more accessible to black Brazilians in Salvador, and in Brazil as a 
whole, and that have also been coupled with welfare policies such as 
Bolsa Família.1 While they recognize these interventions by the state, 
for young people such as Caroline and Claudio, these policies can-
not profoundly change social conditions, as they do not reconstitute 
governing structures. rather, they are instead token palliatives which 
do not improve education at the basic level and neither question why 
the welfare and the literacy levels in black communities are the way 
they are. Therefore, none of these youth are able to entirely celebrate 
what are considered the positive gains from mainstream neoliberal 
and democratic practices. They need a doctor for more than just the 
electoral period, and more than police pacification units to stop crime 
and violence in their communities since neither of these state initia-
tives can challenge the structural reasons for their social visibility and 
their unrelenting civic invisibility (Huggins and Castro, 1996). 
All the same, echoing their peers on the continent, they push for-
wards with a persistent wish and imagination for the future. This is 
one that has the economic minimum, a natural ageing process, com-
munity groups, dreams of a family and educational possibilities. 
While sustaining these dreams they also advance in indifference, in 
inspiration or just in daily movement, motion within motion (Vigh, 
2010), amidst their own general antipathy towards democracy. All the 
while, as can be seen, they look for an inclusive political reality which 
will one day extend to their communities.
1 Bolsa Família can be translated in English as Family Allowance, and is a family 
grant that allocates cash funds to poor families in Brazil to buy food every month. 
This transfer is roughly $100 and is contingent on the children of the recipient fam-
ily regularly attending school. It was launched in 2003 by the Lula administration as 
part of his zero-Hunger program.
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survIvINg NeolIBerAl DeMocrAcY
INDIvIDuAl AND collectIve strAtegIes  
for Youth eMANcIpAtIoNs
AS STATED EArLIEr, this research is oriented by the bid to see what 
political arenas have been established by young people in Kenya and 
Brazil. Specifically, I am interested in how they extend and endure ne-
oliberal democracy and what this says about how they fit into norma-
tive political spaces that are anchored within the hegemonic discours-
es of these two co-constitutive ideologies. It is also an attempt to share 
survival strategies and political imaginations that have emerged from 
poor urban youth in these times where they are increasingly marginal-
ized; approaches that also gesture towards the futures for these youth, 
their urban settings, and the mainstream ‘democratic’ and ‘neoliberal’ 
political processes that have been entrenched in their settings. 
This modest attempt to compare youth experiences from the cur-
rent moment was shaped by three main questions. These are: First 
How do the discourses and practices of democracy and neoliberalism, 
if at all, shape young people’s lives? Second: How do their day-to-day 
actions imply a response to the present ‘democratic’ and ‘neoliberal’ mo-
ment that is said to be characteristic of these two locations, and what 
negotiations (both collective and individual) are part of these responses? 
Third: What are the similarities and dissimilarities in the responses of 
the youth in Nairobi and Salvador, and what can these shared practices 
open up for (neoliberal) democracy?
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The approximations in life conditions for youth in both Salvador 
and Nairobi are explicit and do not need much recounting. Some of 
these are the perils of state violence, and unrelenting socio-econom-
ic uncertainty that provokes versatility in livelihood strategies. This 
economic flexibility is embodied by the poetess who is also a nurse, 
by an IT programmer who is also a juice-maker, and by a small res-
taurant owner who is also a bamboo farmer and furniture maker. In 
addition, the common assertion that life has become harder, even in 
these times of political democracy and when contemporary welfare 
policies, increased business loans and education opportunities ac-
corded to youth are granted, ostensibly, to guarantee an improve-
ment in life conditions from subsequent generations, is echoed in 
both locations.
For the most part, unless probed, the young people whom we 
spoke to here did not explicitly use the terms democracy or neoliber-
alism. As the interview excerpts demonstrate, their main preoccupa-
tions were with the attainment of day-to-day needs for the present, 
and a sustainable minimum for the future. These concerns were for 
food, educational opportunities and a job in the now, and economic 
stability, cultural and recreational spaces and the opportunity to have 
a family for the future. Beyond this parallel in life situations and con-
cerns, there are also convergences in their ideas about the practices of 
normative politics in their contexts. Both their stated present and po-
tential political actions did not reference consistent and enthusiastic 
engagement with the institutions of mainstream electoral democracy. 
rather, they talked about activities such as coming together to share 
knowledge and skills, while also working and saving together; efforts 
that seek to entrench both economic security and socio-ideological 
changes in their individual and collective lives. Evidencing this, for 
Muthuri in Kenya a future hope was for:
[…] A way of supporting ourselves. For example, through forming a 
group and raising some money to purchase something or start a busi-
ness that would be beneficial to the group. There is already a group 
of twenty people contributing 100 shillings daily to buy a motorbike 
[to transport people] that will be shared among members. And apart 
from that, coming together to do voluntary work in the area (Muthuri, 
interview August 29, 2014).
And even if they were part of registered institutions such as ostrom 
youth group or the Communist Party of Brazil, it seems that their 
main way of politicking and engaging with their peers, when they 
are able to it, is in roles that did not wholly affirm what were taken 
as conventional political ways of being. While they did not wholly 
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reject them, and took part in prototype democratic events such as 
elections and civil society organized seminars, their preferred modes 
of peer-engagement were in activities that were ‘informal’ insofar as 
they were not facilitated by or linked to government or civil society 
proper, were focused on socio-economic or socio-cultural survival 
and were fluid.
Stressing youth opposition to established ideas of democracy in 
government funded youth councils in the US, Taft and Gordon (2013) 
argue that many youth involved in these platforms understand de-
mocracy in fundamentally different ways and favour alternate ways of 
democratic participation than is guaranteed within these institution-
alized youth fora. Connected to this, they report that the dissidents 
within these councils had significant frustration with the kinds of rep-
resentative democracy that was being promoted in these government 
settings, and often left. Akin to the young people from both Brazil and 
Kenya who are the focus of this paper, these dissidents questioned the 
kinds of citizenships that undergird and are produced by these youth 
councils; for what ends and for whom they were created. In addition, 
while youth in the US indicated the problematic ways in which ‘voice’ 
was privileged over ‘authority’ and ‘impact’ in these meetings, young 
people in Brazil and Kenya highlighted the grave disconnect between 
the structured inequalities that render their lives bare, and the estab-
lished democracy that does not resolve these conditions; a situation 
that does not even give them ‘voice’. Even if, like their peers in the US, 
they are asking for more ‘horizontal’ political engagements, they are 
also asking for something much bigger than what has become known 
as political democracy.
 Their narratives here emerge from and are placed within par-
ticular intersubjective contexts. The chronicling of their experiences, 
many of which are violent, is not to keep them within particular ‘typo-
logical dimensions’ but to show their context as one where they realise 
that they have to ‘fill in the gaps’ of the government for their survivals 
(Wamucii, 2011: 190- 195). To seal these vacuums, amidst the parallels 
and differences in their situations, these youth offer similar survival 
sharings to help negotiate the conditions in which they find them-
selves. Collectively this is coming together to share knowledge and 
to start cultural and economic groupings. These are essentially fluid 
associations which privilege economic survival but also inhere a poly-
valence which defies categorization, and that make sense within the 
particular ‘underground sociabilities’ of the favela (Jovchelovitch and 
Hernández, 2013); the spontaneous relationships of ‘contradictory 
modalities’ that are part of neoliberal urban life in the global south 
(Simone, 2001: 104).
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Emphasizing the importance of these youth formations, Carlos 
from Brazil shared that:
So I also think the advice I can give is to make connections, for like this 
you begin to open up the range of life. Start making partners and form 
a large web because it is in this union that we will be able to give us the 
strength to change everything that is being imposed on us. So I think 
the advice I can give is this: strengthen the union of the youth. you 
should fight and immerse yourself in everything and not stay with your 
arms crossed expecting change to fall from the sky, or some politician, 
or someone to become like those names from the past like Mahatma 
Gandhi or Zumbi1. Neither will come out of their tombs and help us. I 
think we are the real Zumbis of today, and we have to fight, be warriors 
and be persistent. And we may die there, but we may also get to be with 
our children and inspire them to be able to fight. This will create a new 
youth. My advice is this (Carlos, interview September 29, 2014).
Furthermore, as an individual strategy youth from both Brazil and 
Kenya really emphasised two core actions; the pursuit of education 
and the rallying of internal strength. Education for knowledge is 
important, but, above all, is necessary for the improvement of socio-
economic status. As Savia declared, youth need to study their ‘ass 
off’ because it creates opportunities to come out of the marginalized 
condition they are facing (Savia, interview, September 20, 2014). 
Even so, while there is recognition of the possible bounties of edu-
cation, Prince (2013) argues that there is no promise in these times; 
no assured prosperity even for those who are chasing and have ac-
quired formal educational qualifications and the many attainable, 
often NGo, certificates which are traded like bonds for the future. 
Emphasising this, Comaroff and Comaroff (2000) convey that the 
persistent linear modernist ideals of progress and development, 
which are central to the dogma(s) of a free market economy, have 
been ‘mocked’ by the conditions of youth today despite them attain-
ing higher levels of education than previous generations (Comaroff 
and Comaroff, 2000: 307). Unfortunately, this cohort of young peo-
ple who are jeered by what Abbink (2005: 5) has called ‘faulty mod-
ernizations,’ even with prevailing conditions of large scale unem-
ployment and poor wages, are still informed by enduring narratives 
of education = job. 
1 Zumbi dos Palmares (1645-1695) was the leader of the most famous quilombo 
or maroon community in Brazil called Palmares. This community existed for over a 
hundred years despite the determined state attacks against it. It has become a symbol 
of Afro Brazilian resistance and pride for centuries.
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yet within the ‘debris’ there is ‘optimism,’ even when the pursu-
ance of education and training as a mode of economic stability is 
consistently imperilled by a lack of opportunities (Prince, 2013), and 
even when such close proximity to violence would signal otherwise 
(Pimenta, 2014: 709). Notwithstanding this lack of guarantees and 
general insecurity, there appears to be a metaphysical force, a power-
ful imagination, which connects both individual and collective strat-
egies in an inexorable determination to circumvent the hardships 
of contemporary young life in both Kenya and Brazil. I argue that 
this is a symbiotic process of visualization; of sustaining a creative 
and determined imagination that is both cause and effect, the seed 
and the fruits, even amidst seeming hopelessness. This is maintained 
though intersubjectivity and allows for an unyielding drive that fuels 
the pursuit of another life, another society, another youth. To be sure 
there is a large percentage of youth who are ‘apathetic’, disinterested 
in social and political valued goals, and harbour less positive views 
about the future and its possibilities. And they are many. However, the 
consistency in confidence in the future and the resilience of dreams 
emerging from these youth narratives, while not outwardly routed 
into the cohesive formation of a sustained broad based radical and 
alternative politics, confer the similarity in what youth are dreaming 
about. These are visions of a new society, a more just and egalitarian 
life, community unity, marriage, a family and economic stability. In 
reaching for these dreams, temporal and permanent associations are 
formed that target but are not exclusive to economic survival. These 
are organizations such as youth groups, poetry collectives, savings 
and merry-go-round assemblages, and other types of cultural and 
recreational associations. Within these unions, whether in the fore-
ground or the interstices, spaces are made for political practice which 
do not reference conventional democracy, but are ready to use some 
of its tools when it works for them and dismiss them when they won’t. 
In essence, these fluid kinships labour for a politics that is secured 
in the marginal experiences and dreams of young people (a histori-
cal marginality that is exacerbated by neoliberal democracy), and in 
their momentary or long term existence these associations work for 
the development of a political and economic environment which is 
‘answerable to them’ and for them. 
In their opinion, the problem is not just that democracy is dis-
junctive and that ‘although their political institutions democratize 
with considerable success, and although they promulgate constitu-
tions and legal codes based on the rule of law and democratic val-
ues, the civil component of citizenship remains seriously impaired 
as citizens suffer systematic violations of their rights’  (Caldeira and 
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Holston, 1999: 692). Though this is definitely problematic, these youth 
also take issue with the fact that established political institutions were 
never theirs, and so they do not have faith in the legal or civil institu-
tions that exist, ostensibly, for them to seek redress. For them there 
has never been a real democracy, racial or otherwise, and they have 
never felt like citizens.
Even so, while they may seek audience and alliances with state 
entities when it works for them, for the most part they do not seem to 
have faith in ‘democratizing democracy’ that is often proposed and, 
allegedly, pursued by incumbent regimes. Instead, whether it is via 
reciting poetry on the bus, blogging, opening a car wash in groups and 
even starting savings collectives to cater solely for events like death,2 
they show that they are prepared to work for something bigger that 
will fill in these fractures, these very violent openings, in the norma-
tive political democratic practices that prevail in their locations. 
2 Martha, interview october 27, 2014.
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coNclusIoN
IN HIS ESSAyS oN Africa’s role in the global Ferguson (2006) con-
veys how the 1960s and early 1970s were ‘undoubtedly the halcyon 
days of East African city life full of economic and social promise as 
cities swelled with men, accompanied by their wives and children, 
finding formal sector jobs’ (Ferguson, 2006: 19). These days of feasting 
conceded to fasting when many countries in the south began to expe-
rience the economic crises of the late 1970s and 1980s. The poultice 
prescribed to ease these downward trends were neoliberal reforms 
recommended by international financial institutions commandeered 
by their more powerful Northern member states. Key aspects of these 
reforms were Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) that, Simone 
(2004) argues, brought about increasing impoverishment of much of 
the population throughout Africa, and with pronounced and deep-
ly sinister implications for those who were already in the ‘garbage 
heaps’ of their settings. In addition, there was also an increase in what 
Mbembe (2003) calls ‘theatres of cruelty and desire,’ and, elsewhere, 
the ‘privatization of public prerogatives and socialization of arbitrari-
ness’ (Mbembe, 2001: 389). 
These SAPS became animating elements of these theatres that 
were obliging states to discontinue many of the social services and 
subsidies they had been offering to their citizens, and in this way call-
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ing forth a greater neglect of those who lived, especially, within poor 
urban settlements. In addition, higher food prices and the increasing 
unavailability of health and welfare services made what was often al-
ready bare life more urgent (Ferguson 2006; Comaroff and Comaroff, 
2000: 341; Amann and Baer, 2002). Detailing this process in Cote 
d’Ivoire, Nguyen (2010) highlights how in the 1970s, due to pressure 
from institutions such as the World Bank and the United States Agen-
cy for International Development (USAID), the Ivorian state stopped 
supporting the housing sector as these organizations declared such 
policies incommensurate with the ‘new internal consensus that fa-
voured free market’ (Nguyen, 2010: 132). Parallel to this, in both Bra-
zil and Kenya comparable free market programmes have prevented 
agrarian reform and ensured that interventions such as tax breaks for 
corporations are enacted simultaneously with cuts to social welfare 
and the penal treatment of poverty.
The youth examined here were born or grew up during the ‘lost 
decades’ of economic liberalization; when political democracy and 
neoliberal policy became increasingly mutually constituting. This pa-
per has ethnographically depicted some of their experiences within 
these contemporary moments of neoliberal democracy which appear 
unremitting. It has shown how youth from Nairobi and Salvador are 
moulded by the coeval past and present moments of democracy and 
its avatar neoliberalism; what they think about these practices, how 
they chose to respond to them both individually and collectively, and 
has also gestured to what this may mean for the future(s) of main-
stream politics that is broadly characterized as democratic and ne-
oliberal. The hegemony of the terms democracy and neoliberalism, 
as well as their multiple co-optations and manifestations, piqued my 
curiosity and inspired me to examine how youth related to the con-
figurations of what is said to be normative contemporary politics in 
their locations. Tied to this I felt compelled to interrogate the power 
and salience of these ideological formations that are increasingly used 
to explain our presents.
While there are some expected differences in the lives of 
young people in Kenya and Brazil, and one key difference was the 
prominence of the NGo sphere in Kenya in contrast to Brazil, for 
the most part, the majority of young people in these two countries 
are immersed in situations of comparable precarity. In addition, 
their engagements with these state of affairs was similar. Collec-
tively, both groups of youth advised for the realization of associa-
tions in order to share knowledge, experiences and also to bet-
ter basic economic conditions. Individually there was a marked 
emphasis on the pursuit of educational credentials. overall, the 
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superseding strategy that connected all of these activities was the 
fostering of a dialectical faith; an imagination of a better future 
that materialized from a rallying together of sustained individual 
and collective strength.
 These findings, while comply with the depictions of youth un-
certainties, do not overwhelmingly confirm the ‘crises’ ‘resignation’ 
‘apathy’ and ‘danger’ that characterize many studies of youth, and 
particularly those in the Africa. While heeding the important direc-
tions that much of this referred literature guides us to, as well as 
recognizing the violence that characterizes youth lives, this dystopic 
literature does not always touch on the ways in which young people 
interpret, make sense of and answer back (or sideways) to hegem-
onic practices and discourses that are increasingly ossified in mate-
rial ways in their contexts. Therefore, this work also localizes these 
Brazilian and Kenyan perspectives, in their convergences and differ-
ences, to see what these youth with analogous experiences can share 
with each other in order to get through these more than ‘disjunc-
tive’ democratic times. This is also a Pan African endeavour as I am 
of the opinion that, in this time of the continual approximation of 
Africa and Brazil, there needs to be more bids to get youth thinking 
about the struggles that they are increasingly responsible for each 
other. It is also a way to recognize some of the pathways for existence 
in a period that shows no sign of surrendering ‘democratically’ and 
‘neoliberally’, and which, in a marginalization that is more advanced, 
enacts penalties on youth that extend from Palestine to Florida, Jo-
hannesburg to Istanbul and Nairobi to Salvador.
What does this mean for democracy? What does it mean for neo-
liberalism? As these practices are solidly inserted in the social, psy-
chic and political materialities of both Kenya and Brazil they are im-
possible to ‘vote’ away. Furthermore, it appears that from the Lula to 
Uhuru Kenyatta regimes, even with their unparalleled ‘focus’ (read 
fear) on youth, each government has worked overtime to consolidate 
these neoliberal democratic frontiers that so neglect this generation. 
A myriad of small and big, local and national youth groups and social 
movements such as Reaja ou Será Morto in Brazil, and Bunges (La 
Wananchi, La Wa Mama and La Mashinani) in Kenya, among other 
nameless but powerful associations, are tackling this marginaliza-
tion in their own ways. And even if they just make it up in movement 
forward, in this motion within motion (Vigh, 2010), their localized 
political practices are not just active signs of the disconnect between 
ideology and praxis but something more; an attunement to the inad-
equacies of how democracy takes shape in their contexts and actions, 
however feeble, to make it mean more. 
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Future research can examine how this contemporary preoccu-
pation with the youth ‘problem’ increasingly ties them into regimes 
of control (such as business loans, compulsory registration of youth 
groups) and is also paralleled with larger investments in the armed 
forces of the state, and new policing strategies such as the Pacification 
Police Unit (UPP) in Brazil, and the National youth Service (NyS) in 
Kenya. The particularly gendered impact of such exercises would also 
be imperative to study.
While they work on mitigating daily struggles of a life whose eve-
ry day practices require all of their resources, they are still burdened 
with filling in the (very large) community and personal gaps left by 
a neoliberal political economy. As they do this there is increasingly 
a convergence between their ‘mundane’ and ‘momentous’ practices; 
poetry collectives join Movimento Passe Livre and bamboo furniture 
carpenters become occupy Parliament. These actions ‘present the 
realm of the possible’ (Podder, 2015: 56), the politically possible, that 
goes beyond mere survival. And whether in temporary or permanent 
ways, within this quotidian daily wage political praxis, ‘youth from 
the periphery lift themselves up from what has been imposed on them’ 
(Claudio, interview october 5, 2014), and in movement forward forget 
to ‘dream’ about democracy. 
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